Social security trust fund (SSTF), the government fiscal use of the SSTF, and intergenerational equity by Kim, Jae Kyeong
Retrospective Theses and Dissertations Iowa State University Capstones, Theses andDissertations
1997
Social security trust fund (SSTF), the government
fiscal use of the SSTF, and intergenerational equity
Jae Kyeong Kim
Iowa State University
Follow this and additional works at: https://lib.dr.iastate.edu/rtd
Part of the Economics Commons, Political Science Commons, and the Public Affairs, Public
Policy and Public Administration Commons
This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Iowa State University Capstones, Theses and Dissertations at Iowa State University
Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Retrospective Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Iowa State University
Digital Repository. For more information, please contact digirep@iastate.edu.
Recommended Citation
Kim, Jae Kyeong, "Social security trust fund (SSTF), the government fiscal use of the SSTF, and intergenerational equity " (1997).
Retrospective Theses and Dissertations. 11997.
https://lib.dr.iastate.edu/rtd/11997
INFORMATION TO USERS 
This manuscript has been reproduced from the microfihn master. UMI 
fihns the text directly from the original or copy submitted. Thus, some 
thesis and dissertation copies are in typewriter face, while others may be 
from any type of computer printer. 
The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the 
copy submitted. Broken or indistinct print, colored or poor quality 
illustrations and photographs, print bleedthrough, substandard margins, 
and improper alignment can adversely aflfect reproduction. 
In the unlikely event that the author did not send UMI a complete 
manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if 
unauthorized copyright material had to be removed, a note will indicate 
the deletion. 
Oversize materials (e.g., maps, drawings, charts) are reproduced by 
sectioning the original, beginning at the upper left-hand comer and 
continuing from left to right in equal sections with small overlaps. Each 
original is also photographed in one exposure and is included in reduced 
form at the back of the book. 
Photographs included in the original manuscript have been reproduced 
xerographically in this copy. Higher quality 6" x 9" black and white 
photographic prints are available for any photographs or illustrations 
appearing in this copy for an additional charge. Contact UMI directly to 
order. 
UMI 
A Bell & Howell loformadon Company 
300 North Zeeb Road, Ann Arbor MI 48106-1346 USA 
313/761-4700 800/521-0600 

Social security trust fund (SSTF), the government fiscal use of the SSTF, 
and intergenerationai equity 
by 
Jae Kyeong Kim 
A dissertation submitted to the graduate faculty 
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of 
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY 
Major; Economics 
Major Professors: Charles W. Meyer and Leigh Tesfatsion 
Iowa State University 
Ames, Iowa 
1997 
Copyright © Jae Kyeong Kim, 1997. All rights reserved. 
DMI Number: 9814657 
Copyright 1997 by 
Kim, Jae Kyeong 
All rights reserved. 
UMI Microform 9814657 
Copyright 1998, by UMI Company. All rights reserved. 
This microform edition is protected against unauthorized 
copying under Title 17, United States Code. 
UMI 
300 North Zeeb Road 
Ann Arbor, MI 48103 
II  
Graduate College 
Iowa State University 
This is to certify that the Doctoral dissertation of 
Jae Kyeong Kim 




For Ae Graduate College 
Signature was redacted for privacy.
Signature was redacted for privacy.
Signature was redacted for privacy.
Signature was redacted for privacy.
I l l  
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
LIST OF FIGURES %• 
LIST OF TABLES vii 
CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION I 
CHAPTER 2. THE ECONOMIC MODEL 13 
2.L Basic Model Structure 13 
2.2. Endowments and Preferences 15 
2.3. Budget Constraints 16 
2.4. Social Security System 17 
2.5. Young Agent's Optimization Problem 23 
2.6. Production Technology 27 
2.7. Capital Accumulation 30 
2.8. Definition of Equilibrium 31 
2.9. Equilibrium in a Reduced Per-Capita Form 34 
2.10. Mathematical Verification of the Economic Model 40 
2.11. Nature of Equilibrium 46 
2.12. Features of the Economic Model 48 
CHAPTER 3. SIMULATIONS 51 
3.1. Key Questions 51 
3.2. Computation of an Equilibrium Allocation 57 
3.3. Measures of Welfare Benefit and Intergenerational Equity 60 
3.4. Unfunded Social Security Tax Policy and Actuarial Status 62 
3.5. Social Security Funding Policy and Intergenerational Equity 
Case I: ag = 0, a^ = 1.0 77 
3.6. Social Security Funding Policy and Intergenerational Equity 
Case U: ag = 1.0 89 
3.7. Social Security Funding Policy and Intergenerational Equity 
Case ni: ag = a^ = 0 97 
3.8. Sensitivity Tests 105 
CHAPTER 4. A SUMMARY 116 
4.1. The Economic Model 116 
4.2. Responses of the Economy 117 
4.3. Actuarial Status as Measure of Intergenerational Equity 120 
4.4. SSTF, the Government Fiscal Use of the SSTF, and RWB 121 
IV 
4.5. Structural Aspects 125 
CHAPTER 5. CONCLUDING REMARKS 127 
REFERENCES 130 
LIST OF HGURES 
Figiire 2.1: The Diamond economy 
from the perspective of generation t 14 
Figure 2.2; The structure of social security system 
from the perspective of generation t 21 
Figure 3.1: Time paths of key variables as the SS tax policy t changes 0 to .4 
~-5 = 0;n = .012, A=1.0, a = .3, P = .5 65 
Figure 3.2: Time profile of welfare and social security actuarial status 
as the SS tax policy T changes from 0 to .4 
—5 = 0; n = .012, A = l.O, a = .3, P = .5 68 
Figure 3.3: Time paths of key variables 
as the SS funding policy 5 changes from 0 to 1: 
Case I (ag = 0, a^ = 1.0) 
—T = .2; n = .012, A = 1.0, a = .3, p = .5 79 
Figure 3.4: Time profiles of intergenerational equity measures 
as the SS funding policy 5 changes from 0 to 1: 
Case I (ag = 0, a^ = 1.0) 
--i: = .2;n = .012, A=1.0, a = .3, p = .5 80 
Figure 3.5: Time paths of key variables 
as the SS flinding policy 5 changes from 0 to 1: 
Case II (ag = 1.0) 
—T = .2; n = .012, A = 1.0, a = .3, p = .5 91 
Figure 3.6: Time profiles of intergenerational equity measures 
as the SS funding policy 5 changes from 0 to 1: 
Case n (ag = 1.0) 
—X = .2; n = .012, A = 1.0, a = .3, p = .5 92 
Figure 3.7: Time paths of key variables 
as the SS funding policy 5 changes from 0 to 1: 
Case in (ag = a^ = 0) 
—T = .2;n = .012, A= 1.0, a = .3, P = .5,>.={1,3} 98 
VI 
Figure 3.8: Time profiles of intergenerational equity measures 
as the social security flmding policy 5 changes from 0 to 1: 
Case m (ag = a,£ = 0) 
—T = .2;n = .012, A= 1.0,a = .3, p = .5, {1,3} 
Figure 3.9: Sensitivity of intergenerational equity measures 
to changes in n, a, and p for Case IV (ag = .5, a^ = 1.0) 
--T = .2; n = {.012, -.012}, (1 - a) = {.7, .65}, P = {.5, .55} 
Figure 4.1: Comparison of intergenerational equity 
under alternative SS funding policies 6 and alternative 
alternative fiscal policy uses of the SSTF 
—T = .2;n = .012, A= 1.0,a = .3, P = .5,?i= {1,3} 
Vll 
LIST OF TABLES 
Table 3.1: Equilibrium of the economic model 
in the absence of a social security system 
--T = 0; n = .012, A = 1.0, a = .3, p = .5 
Table 3.2: Steady state equilibrium and intergenerational equity 
for the economic model under alternative SS tax policies x 
—5 = 0; n = .012, A = 1.0, a = .3, p = .5 
Table 3.3: Steady state equilibrium and intergenerational equity 
for the economic model under alternative SS funding polices 5 
Case I (ag = 0, a^ = 1.0) 
—T = .2; n = .012, A = 1.0, a = .3, p = .5 
Table 3.4: Steady state equilibrium and intergenerational equity 
for the economic model under alternative SS funding polices 5 
Case n (ag = 1.0) 
—T = .2; n = .012, A = 1.0, a = .3, P = .5 
Table 3.5: Steady state equilibrium and intergenerational equity 
for the economic model under alternative SS funding polices 5 
Case ni (ag = afc = 0) 
—T = .2; n = .012, A = 1.0, a = .3, p = .5, ?. = {1.0, 3.0} 
Table 3.6: Sensitivity tests with respect to n, a, and P 
for Case IV (ag = .5, a^ = 1.0) 
—T = .2; n = {.012, -.012}, a = {.3, .35}, p = {.5, .55} 
Table 4.1: Effects on key variables and intergenerational equity 
of alternative SS funding policies 5 and alternative 
government fiscal policy uses of the SSTF 
—T = .2; n = .012, A = 1.0, a = .3, p = .5, >. = {l.O, 3.0} 
1 
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
A social security (SS) system can be designed in various ways and have its own 
distinctive purpose to achieve, although this purpose may come in many guises. For 
example, the system may be designed for the purpose of meeting individuals' life-time 
utility maximization motives and/or a benevolent reformer's generational welfare 
maximization motive. As time passes by and the state of economy changes, however, the 
once established design may not be able to serve its purpose any more. This may be the 
beginning of the time when the soundness of a SS system is questioned and so is its 
prospect. The eventual next step would be to take advantage of changes in the economic 
state to revise the SS system, perhaps with a different purpose. 
Although there is no shortage of historical examples for this process, the current 
trend in SS systems around the world is a case in point. In the years of the post-war 
population increase and unprecedentally strong economic performance, most developed 
countries implemented unfunded (pay-as-you-go) SS systems. In recent years, many of 
these same countries began to move toward a flmded SS system through the accumulation 
of a social security trust flmd (SSTF). 
It is often considered that the underlying motivations behind the current 
transformations of SS systems from unfunded to flmded could, to a large extent, be 
accounted for by a wide range of demographic changes, one of which is a decreasing 
working population relative to the retired population. A typical argument for this view 
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would look like this: an increasing "dependency ratio," defined as the ratio of retired 
population to working population, may come against a pure pay-as-you-go SS system 
because it depresses the rate of return on SS tax contributions.' Or, in a bit stronger 
version, a flmded SS system may be preferred to an unfunded one in the presence of the 
inevitably lower rate of retum on pay-as-you-go SS tax contributions. Miguel-Angel and 
Lopez-Garcia (1991) imply that there is no certain a priori ground for this conclusion, 
however. They argue that, when the market interest rate is greater than the growth rate of 
the population, an increase in the population growth rate could possibly improve steady-
state welfare in the presence of an unfunded SS system. 
Economists have also argued that a transition firom an unfimded SS system to a 
fully funded SS system does not necessarily enhance economic efficiency or lead to 
welfare improvement. For instance, Breyer (1989) argues that the transition does not 
compensate the welfare loss of the then-old generation without hurting at least one of the 
later generations. Homburg (1990) argues against this result. His study suggests that, if 
labor supply is endogenous, compensating for all the lost SS benefits of the then-old 
generation through huge amounts of one-period external government bonds would reduce 
the distortional effect in the labor market and thus the transition from an unfunded to a 
fimded system can be Pareto improving. 
' As shown later, the SS tax contribution of an individual agent earns a rate of retum which is composed of 
the rates of growth in generational population and wage. See Aaron (1966) for a more detailed account of the 
rate of retum on SS tax contribution. 
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Although scenarios of the transition from an unfunded SS system to a fully funded 
SS system have been presented in several simulation models, the existence of a transition 
path which would improve the welfare of every generation has not been demonstrated." 
For example, Huang, imrohorogiu, and Sargent (1995) evaluate two alternative schemes 
for compensating losses resulting from the sudden termination of a pay-as-you-go 
(unfunded) SS system. In the first compensated 'buy out' scheme, the termination of an 
unftmded SS system is followed by replacing the current SS benefit by a one period 
govenunent external debt. In the second 'government run' scheme, instead of issuing an 
'entitlement' bond, fiscal policies are implemented in such a fashion that the SS benefits 
are financed through government claims on publicly held private physical capital. The 
authors show that the second experiment provides larger benefits to later generations, but 
the efficacy of the 'government run' scheme depends on the performance of private 
capital. 
However, there is an important consideration missing in recent advances in the 
transition study of SS systems. Most transition studies have focused on instantaneous 
transition from unflmded to funded systems. More realistically, the transition will be 
gradual, and the key to understanding the transition will lie in the analysis of a partially 
flmded SS system with a varying size of the SSTF. 
" For example, see Seidman (1986) for the transition and Auerbach and Kotlikoff(l985) for reversed 
transition. 
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The main concern of this dissertation is to try to understand the transformation 
process of a SS system from unfunded to funded, not just from a comparison of rates. 
such as the rates of return on physical capital and SS tax contributions and the growth rate 
of the population, and not just from a comparison of two polar SS systems such as 
unfunded and fully funded, but from a general equilibrium analysis which we believe to 
be more adequate. We consider a wide range of possible SS arrangements and possible 
government uses of the SSTF. We have, throughout, a twofold objective. First, we wish 
to track down the general equilibrium effects of alternative SS arrangements ranging from 
pure pay-as-you-go to fiilly funded, including effects on intergenerational equity over 
time. Second, we wish to explore the various consequences that result from different uses 
of the SSTF by goverrunent under each of the alternative arrangements for which at least 
some degree of funding occurs. 
To carry out this investigation, we first need to construct a basic economic model. 
We modify the model of an economy developed by Diamond (1965)—hereafter referred 
to as the "Diamond Economy"— to incorporate a SS structure. By a Diamond Economy 
we mean a two period lived overlapping generations economy in which private agents 
engage in consumption and production decisions. More precisely, in the Diamond 
Economy there is a single non-storable output (such as a seed that would rot away unless 
eaten or planted), and each young agent has one luiit of labor endowment which is 
supplied inelastically to a production process in return for a real wage. The wage income 
may either be consumed when young or invested as physical capital into the subsequent 
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period's production process in return for capital income which is consumed when old. All 
agents are structurally identical apart from time of birth. Young agents cannot borrow and 
old agents do not work. The Diamond Economy is deterministic in the sense that there is 
no stochastic element. One deviation of our model from the Diamond Economy is that 
physical capital in any given period depreciates completely at the end of the period. 
The SS system is incorporated into the Diamond Economy in parameterized form, 
which permits the comparative dynamic study of a range of SS systems from pure pay-as-
you-go to fully funded. This leads us to review various important historical examples of 
the ways in which both social and private security systems have been implemented. The 
current U.S. SS system provides a basic benchmark example. The U.S. system requires a 
certain amount of SS tax payments saved or dissaved in order to keep a close actuarial 
balance of SS tax payments and benefits during a certain time period.' A crucial element 
of the U.S. SS system relevant to our study lies in the changing size of the SSTF over 
time, which leads us to realize that the transformation of a SS system from nonfunded to 
fully funded is capable of being stated in terms of a SSTF fraction, i.e., the fraction of SS 
tax benefits that are allocated to a SSTF. We therefore consider, in our model, a family of 
SS arrangements parameterized by two basic exogenously given parameters ranging from 
0 to 1: namely, a SS tax rate and a trust fund fraction. 
^ See "The 1996 Annual Report of the Board of Trustees of the Federal Old-Age and Survivors Insurance 
and Disability Insurance (1996)" for a detailed definition of "close actuarial balance". 
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In exploring general equilibrium economic and welfare effects of the SSTF in a 
more fruitful fashion, we also consider the government use of the SSTF. Contrasted with 
the traditional assumption in the related literature of the SSTF being invested only as a 
physical capital item into a production process"^, we postulate that the SSTF could, 
additionally, take the form either of a redistributive transfer item to current generations or 
of a human capital investment item resulting in increases in the efficiency of raw labor in 
next period. The inspiration for this extension again derives from a real world situation, 
one of which can be traced down in the U.S. SS system, although there is no explicit 
consideration of that. 
That is, in the real world, the SSTF could be different from a private trust fund. 
While it is fair enough to consider a corporate trust fund as a kind of debt obligation to 
the firm, it is not always likely to be the case that the SSTF should be thought of as a debt 
obligation to SS tax payers.^ For instance, the U.S. government, in a document entitled 
"Analytical Perspectives," seems to clarify this matter. ''Unlike the assets of private 
pension plans, they (U.S. social security trust funds) do not consist of real economic 
assets that can be drawn down in the future to fund benefits.'" It continues, "...the Federal 
Government owns the assets and earnings of Federal trust fiinds, and it can raise or 
lower future trust fund collections and payments, or change the purpose for which the 
* This traditional assumption regarding the SSTF is not necessarily accurate for real economies. Only a 
small number of SS systems in the world satisfy the assimiption. One is the Chilean SS system where the 
SSTF is in the form of mandatory personal accounts invested in fmancial markets. See Diamond and 
Valdes-Prieto (1994) for a detailed description of the Chilean SS system. 
' For details, see Bikhchandani and Huang (1994) for Treasury Securities in general. Moreover, see 
Tabellini (1991) for the difference between SSTF and a public-issued bond. 
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collections are used, by changing existing law." ^ Strictly following this statement, the 
U.S. SSTF is owned by the U.S. government, not by SS tax payers. It may surprise some 
U.S. SS tax payers who presume that the SSTF is held in the form of an equity claim. 
The important implication of the U.S. practice regarding the SSTF for our study is 
that the real and ultimate economic and welfare import of the SSTF may depend strongly 
on the government's use of the SSTF. The government fiscal policy regarding the SSTF 
is parameterized in our model by introducing two additional exogenous ly given 
parameters ranging fi"om 0 to 1: namely, the government redistributive transfer fraction 
and the physical capital investment fraction, with any remaining flmds then assumed to 
be allocated to human capital investment. We then show that varying fiscal policy 
regarding the use of the SSTF dramatically alters the response of both private and 
government saving, affecting the real wage rate, the rate of return on physical capital, and 
the implicit rate of return on SS tax payments. These effects, in turn, have numerous 
general equilibrium feedback impacts on private saving. In particular, the capital 
accumulation process depends on what the government does with the SSTF. 
In short, we incorporate a wide range of possible SS arrangements and possible 
government uses of the SSTF into the Diamond Economy. No profound theory will be 
found in this study. We have aimed only at putting together some aspects which are 
inspired by what we hope is relevant to our study purpose. Private agents pay SS taxes 
^ Executive Office of the President. Office of Management and Budget Analytical Perspectives, Budget of 
the United States Government, Fiscal Year 1996. Washington, D.C., U.S. Government Printing Office, 
1995, p. 251. 
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when young and are entitled to receive SS benefits when old. SS benefits are determined, 
first, by the way the SS system is arranged, and, second, by the way the government uses 
the SSTF, if any. An agent behaves optimally in terms of his personal saving. His 
optimizing behavior is simraiarized by maximizing his lifetime utility subject to a budget 
constraint, taking as given relative prices and the SS system. The latter is characterized in 
terms of two SS arrangement parameters and two government fiscal policy parameters 
regarding the use of the SSTF. 
It is worthwhile to note the assimiption that young agents have no access to 
borrowing. This assumption is motivated by the very construction of our economic 
model. First, there is no way for young agents to engage in purely private borrowing 
contracts; agents when old have no incentive to lend their old age income to young agents 
in a given period because there is no way for the young to repay them. Moreover, the 
model does not postulate the existence of an unbacked bond market either by the 
government as assumed in the later part of Diamond (1965) or by a private financial 
intermediary as assumed in Pingle and Tesfatsion (1997). 
Afler constructing and analyzing our economic model, we simulate the model to 
explore the general equilibrium economic and intergenerational equity consequences of 
introducing altemative SS systems. As argued in Kydland and Prescott (1996), in 
simulation experiments it is important to start by posing a set of well-defined quantitative 
questions.' We primarily focus on the following questions: 
1. How will the model economy respond to different SS arrangements, from unfunded to 
funded, and to different uses by government of the SSTF? 
2. How effective is the SS actuarial status of individual agents (i.e., benefits received 
relative to taxes paid, in present value terms) as a measure of intergenerational 
equity? What could be an alternative measure? 
3. What are the consequences of alternative SS arrangements and government uses of the 
SSTFfor intergenerational equity measures in terms of the time profiles of SS 
actuarial status and an alternatively postulated measure based on normalized lifetime 
utility? For instance, does a build-up of the SSTF necessarily improve 
intergenerational equity in terms of either of these two measures? 
4. In general, does there exist any meaningful relationship(s) between the size and use of 
the SSTF and intergenerational equity? If so, how does it depend on structural aspects 
of the economic such as the population size, labor share, and consumer time 
preference? 
Some of the results found during the course of the simulations are surprising. 
First, there are several occasions in which the specific type of SS arrangement and of the 
government policy use of the SSTF does not matter, as will be clarified later on. The 
' Following Kydland and Prescott (1996), one of the best examples can be found in Auerbach and 
Kotlikoff(1987). 
reason for this is that what is ultimately relevant for agent's rational economic decision 
making is whether or not his lifetime utility increases, not the particular way of earning 
income or the timing of income. In short, as long as their lifetime utilities remain 
unchanged, agents do not distinguish between types of SS systems. 
Second, SS actuarial status is not an effective measure of intergenerational equity 
simply because the measure is not sufficient to reflect the full gain or loss of agent utility 
associated with a switch between SS systems. This suggests how an evaluation of a SS 
arrangement strictly on the basis of the actuarial status of consumers can be mistaken. 
Third, the intergenerational welfare consequences of the government policy use of 
the SSTF depends not only on the type of government expenditure, more particularly, on 
who will receive the benefits, but also on the extent of the benefits. For instance, it is 
mistaken to assume that fiiture generations will necessarily be fi-ee fi-om possible burden 
in the case of a financial squeeze simply because the SSTF is spent for their sake in the 
form of human capital investment on their raw labor to enhance their labor productivity. 
When the government uses the SSTF for human capital investment and the productivity 
of human capital investment is relatively low, simulations show that increased human 
capital investment can actually decrease intergenerational equity for all generations. 
Fourth, surprisingly, the general notion that the population growth rate has an 
important intergenerational welfare implication regarding a SS system is not necessarily 
true in our economic model. Our sensitivity tests show that a change in the population 
growth rate does not always change the ordering of the steady state intergenerational 
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equity measures over different SS funding policies, indicating that having a particular 
population growth rate does not necessarily make one type of SS arrangement more 
preferable than another. 
Although there has been a large volume of economic research on the SSTF and 
intergenerational equity, we consider most of the literature as rather remote to our smdy 
because there are many ways in which the economic model of this paper differs from 
those of the related literature. First, our parameterization of the SS system permits the 
consideration of a wide range of its possible arrangements. Having a wide range of SS 
systems discussed in one setting is relatively new to the current economic research in this 
area. As one of the closest studies to ours, Blanchet and Kessler (1991) explore some 
optimal funding policies for a SS system by introducing two polar SS systems—a fully 
funded and an unfunded SS system—into the economy simultaneously. However, they do 
not consider intermediate cases as is done in the current paper. 
The present study differs, again, in that it incorporates the government fiscal 
policy use of the SSTF. Although critical in evaluating the economic and 
intergenerational equity effects of a given (partially or fully) funded SS system, a formal 
incorporation of the government use of the SSTF has previously been to a large extent 
neglected. This neglect can be attributed, partly, to the fact that a large build-up of the 
SSTF is a relatively new phenomenon, and, partly, to the notion ingrained in the study of 
SS systems that a consideration of the government use of the SSTF is outside the study of 
the system. With diese two facts intermingled, a certain narrowly defined physical capital 
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investment use of the SSTF is often assumed even in a general equilibrium analysis. 
Instead, the current dissertation considers various possible government policy uses of the 
SSTF including redistributive transfer and human capital investment as well as physical 
capital investment. 
The present study differs, also, in the ways in which it explicitly defines the term 
"intergenerational equity." As the debate on equity in intergenerational contexts attracts 
growing attention, the term "intergenerational equity" is used more frequently but often 
without any concrete quantitative definition of the term. We define two alternative 
measures of "intergenerational equity." One considered definition is from a "within SS 
system" perspective, and the other is from a lifetime utility perspective. 
The construction of the dissertation is as follows: Chapter 2 sets out the basic 
model, a Diamond (1965) overlapping generations economy modified to include a SS 
system. Some of the main dynamic features of the economic model are also analytically 
derived and discussed. Chapter 3 first raises key questions to be answered during the 
course of the simulation experiments. The parameterization and computational details of 
the experiments are then presented. Finally, simulation experiments, including sensitivity 
tests, are conducted and their results are discussed, answering the key questions. Chapter 
4 summarizes the simulation results. Concluding remarks are given in Chapter 5. 
13 
CHAPTER 2. THE ECONOMIC MODEL 
2.1. Basic Model Structure 
The model extends the overlapping generations model first developed by 
Samuelson (1958) and later by Diamond (1965), by incorporating a social security (SS) 
system. At the beginning of each period t > 1, a new generation of agents appears, where 
each agent lives for two periods. Generation t is the set of all agents bom at the beginning 
of period t. In each period t, the generation t agents are called the young age agents and 
the generation t - 1 agents the old age agents. All agents in this economy are structurally 
identical apart fi-om time of birth. 
Let Nt denote the number of agents in generation t. The population grows at a 
constant net rate n per period, where n > -1. It follows that the law of motion for births is 
stated as 
N. . ,  =  (1  +  n)N, ,  t>0,  (2-1)  
where the number of old age agents in period 1, NQ, is assumed to be given by some 
positive constant Nq. 
This basic model structure is depicted in Figure 2.1. 
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Figure 2.1: The Diamond economy from the perspective of generation t 
2.2. Endowments and Preferences 
Each young agent in generation t > 1 works for one period and then retires for the 
next period. He also has an endowment of time normalized to one at the beginning period 
of his life which he supplies inelastically to a period t production process for wage 
income in period t. The only way for the generation t young agent to transfer the wage 
income in period t to the future period is through the saving of his wage income. This 
saving is invested in a time t + 1 production process in the form of time t + 1 physical 
capital, which generates capital income in period t + 1. 
A generation t young agent bom at the beginning of period t has the following 
lifetime utility function in period t: 
U(c:, c:.,) = P logcf + (1 -P)Iogc:.„ (2-2) 
where U(*, •) is the lifetime utility of the generation t young agent; cf and c°,, are the 
consumption levels of the generation t agent in his young and old age, respectively; p is 
his subjective weight on young age consumption, 0 < ^ < 1; and U(*, •) is continuous 
and twice continuously differentiable, strictly increasing in each of its argimients, and 
strictly concave. 
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2.3. Budget Constraints 
A generation t young agent consumes, saves, and pays a SS tax out of his wage 
income and lump-sum transfer in period t. Let w, denote his wage rate in period t in terms 
of the time t output good and let sj* denote his personal saving in period t. The budget 
constraint faced by the generation t young agent in period t is 
where T is the SS tax rate in period t and T; is a lump-sum transfer in period t. 
In period t + I the generation t old agent will consume his capital income (the 
return on his saving), SS benefits, bt+1, and lump-sum transfer, 7, +1. Let , denote the 
net rate of return on personal saving in period t + 1. Then the budget constraint faced by 
the generation t old agent in period t + 1 is 
We assume that the generation t young agent has no access to borrowing. This 
assumption is motivated by the very construction of the model itself. First, there is no 
incentive for agents to engage in purely private borrowing contracts. The generation 
t - 1 old agents have no incentive to lend their old age income to the generation t young 
cf + sf = [1 - r]w, + T,, (2-3) 
C ,  = (1 +  r . . , ) s [ '  +  b . . ,  +  T. . , .  (2-4) 
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agents because there is no way for the young to repay them, and vice versa. Second, the 
model does not postulate the existence of an unbacked bond market. Thus, the generation 
t young consumer faces a restricted access to future possible incomes such as his own 
capital income, social security benefit, and lump-sum transfer in period t + I. The 
assumption that no one in the economy is allowed to borrow can be stated as 
sf > 0, Vt. (2-5) 
2.4. Social Security System 
Suppose that, at the beginning of period I, a SS system is implemented as an 
additional means of securing both generation young and old needs. The basic structure of 
the SS system is as follows: Each generation t young agent pays a SS tax in period t 
which is proportional to his wage income, and is then entitled to receive a SS benefit 
when old. Let r denote the SS tax rate. The SS tax payment, v„ is then given by 
Vt = (2-6) 
where 0 < r< 1. 
The government puts aside a fi-actional amoimt of the aggregate SS tax payments 
in period t in the form of a social security trust fund (SSTF) in period t and distributes the 
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other fractional amount to the generation t - 1 old agents as part of their social security-
benefits in period t. Let Sdenote the Section put aside in the form of an SSTF. The SSTF 
in period t, denoted by SSTFj, is then given by 
where 0< S< 1. 
The use of the SSTF depends on the government fiscal policy. The government 
fiscal policy is assumed here to consist of govenunent transfers and government saving, 
where the latter in turn consists of physical capital investment and human capital 
investment in the immediately following period. The SSTF thus constitutes the revenue 
source for government fiscal expenditures. Let G, denote government redistributive 
transfer expenditures in period t and let Sf denote government saving in period t. Let ag 
denote the fraction of the SSTF that is devoted to redistributive transfers. Then period t 
government redistributive transfer expenditures, G„ and government saving, Sf, are 
given, respectively, by 
SSTF, = (2-7) 
G, = a^SSTF,; (2-8) 
Sf = (1 - a^)SSTF,, (2-9) 
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where 0 < < 1. 
Let Kf., denote government physical capital investment in period t -h 1 and let 
Hj., denote government human capital investment in period t + 1. Let a^ denote the 
fraction of the government saving that goes to Kf.,. Then period t + 1 government 
physical capital investment, Kf.,, and human capital investment, H,.,, are given, 
respectively, by 
where 0 < a;. < 1. Initial government investments are assumed to be given by 
Kf = H, = 0, implying that the SS system is implemented at the beginning of period 
1. 
We assume that the government redistributes Gt equally among living agents in 
period t in a lump-sum fashion. Thus the lump-simi transfer in period t, denoted by Tt, is 
Kf- .  =  a ,Sf ;  (2-10) 
H.. ,  =  (1  -  aJSf ,  (2-11) 
^ t 
N.. ,  +  N 
(2-12) 
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Also, we assume that the government capital income in period t 1 accrued from the 
physical investment of the aic(l - ag) fractional amount of the SSTF in period t goes to the 
generation t old SS benefits. A generation t old agent in period t + 1 thus receives his SS 
benefits from two sources: One is from the SS tax payments by the generation t 1 
young and the other is from government capital income in period t + 1. The SS benefits 
for the generation t old agent in period t + 1, denoted by b, ^are thus given by 
_ [1 - ^]v.-,N.,, (1 + r,.,)Kf., 
N. 
b , . ,  =  ^ ,  ( 2 - 1 3 )  
for t > 1. For the given set of initial government capital investments Kf = H, = 0. the 
SS benefits of each generation 0 old agent, b,, is given by 
^ [1 - c?]v,N. + (1 + r,)Kf ^ [1 - ^v,N, 
No N, • 
As Figure 2.2 details, a particular SS system for the economy at hand is 
characterized by different specifications of the four parameters r, S, ag, and a^, which 
respectively represent the SS tax rate, the SSTF fraction, the government transfer 
fraction, and the government physical capital investment fraction. From now on, we refer 
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Figure 2.2: The structure of the social security (SS) system from the perspective of 
generation t 
to (r, 5. Og, aiJ as the SS system. Thus, for instance, given r. a^. and a^, a SS can be 
distinguished as an unfunded system (5=Q),2i partially funded system (0 < «?< 1), or a 
fully fimded system {S= 1). Under the unflmded (pay-as-you-go) SS system, aggregate 
SS tax payments made by the generation t young agents in period t are simply transferred 
to the generation t - 1 old agents in period t. 
It is often considered that a pay-as-you-go SS system, as an intergenerational 
transfer program, earns an implicit rate of return on tax payments that critically depends 
on the biological interest rate n. So, as demography changes in such a way that the 
population decreases, the implicit return on the SS tax payments decreases and vice versa. 
This popular notion is potentially misleading in the sense that only a certain set of limited 
market interactions are considered, as will be clarified further later on. It is also thought 
by many that, when the social security system is run on a fully funded basis, the rate of 
return on the tax payments will be exactly the same as the market interest rate in period 
t+1, presuming that there is only one interest rate. This latter notion is, in fact, very 
similar to the previous notion in the sense that it may have almost equal possibility of 
being misleading. It does hold under certain restricted sets of conditions. For example, it 
holds if all of the SS tax payments made by the generation t young in period t are saved 
and invested as physical capital in period t + 1, and capital income on the investment goes 
to the SS benefits of old agents in period t + 1. 
The government fiscal policy regarding the use of the SSTF is described by 
different specifications of the policy parameters ag and a^. For instance, for given 
positive values of rand d, the government fiscal policy in its extreme can be 
distinguished as a government transfer policy only (ag = 1), a government physical capital 
investment policy only (ag = 0 and a.^ = I), or a human capital investment item only (a^ = 
\ = 0). It is questioned, often without much logical justification, whether the use of the 
SSTF in the form of a government transfer item (a^ = 1) would be detrimental to SS 
benefits, and, more importantly, if so, then by how much. Also, it is virtually unknown 
what potential consequences the use of the SSTF in the form of human capital investment 
(Eg = a^ = 0) would evenmally lead to. Should not the use of the SSTF then be restricted 
in such a fashion that the SSTF is invested as physical capital and the return on this 
particular investment is distributed out to its presumed owners, the SS tax payers? With 
the question being granted, can the use of the SSTF in the form of physical capital 
investment (ag = 0 and a^ = 1) justify the very existence of the SSTF itself, especially 
when the investment raises the relative abundance of physical capital stock to labor stock 
and thus depresses the other source of old age income, the return on personal saving? 
2.5. Young Agent's Optimization Problem 
The consumption and saving decisions of a generation t young agent are 
endogenously determined by his optimizing behavior. The optimizing behavior is 
summarized by maximizing his life-time utility within his means, taking relative prices 
and the SS system as given. More precisely, the generation t young agent takes as given 
the wage rate Wj in period t and the rate of return r, +, on saving in period t + i, the SS tax 
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rate x when young and the SS benefit bj., when old, and the lump-sum transfers T; in 
period t and T,., in period t + 1. The lifetime utility maximization problem faced by a 
generation t yoimg agent is 
MaxPlogcf + (1 -p)logc°.,, (2-15) 
with respect to c,^, c°.,, andsf subject to the budget and non-negativity constramts 
cf + sf = [1 - r]w^ 4- T,; (2-16) 
C. = (1 - r,.,)sE' + b.,, + T..,; (2-17) 
sf > 0, c;^ > 0, c^., > 0. (2-18) 
Given (w„ r,+T, bt+,, T„ T,+,), we can use the two budget constraints to 
express the consumption levels in the utility function in terms of the personal saving sf 
in period t. The generation t young agent's optimization problem can then be stated as: 
Max plog([l-T]w. + T. - s,") + (l-P)log((l + r,.,)s|' + b.., + T,., ), (2-19) 
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with respect to sj" subject to the non-negativity constraints 
sf > 0; (2-20) 
[1 - r]w^ + T, - sj" > 0; (2-21) 
(I + r..,)sf + b,., + T.., > 0. (2-22) 
Assuming an interior solution, the first-order necessary condition for the problem 
(2-19)-(2-22) is 
P - (1 -/?)(! +r,.,) 
([1 - r]w, + T, - sf) (1 + r,.,)s|' + b,., + T,., ' 
by which his optimal saving decision is summarized. That is, rearranging (2- 23), the 
generation t young agent's optimal saving is given by 
sf = (1 - /?)([1 - r]w. +T.) - /S),., + T,,, (1 + r..,) 
= s''(w,, r,.,, r, b,.,, T„ T,.,). 
(2-24) 
Conversely, if the right side of (2-24) can be shown to be strictly positive and less than 
[1 - r]w, + Tt, then an interior solution exists. ^  
The demand function for the generation t young agent's saving (2-24), together 
with (2-14)-(2-16), leads us to his optimal demands for consumption levels in both 
periods and his optimized utiUty as functions of Wj, r,.r, b,.T,, and T,. 
c f  = [1  -  T ] W ,  +T , - s|'(w„ r , . , ,  T ,  b . . , ,  T, ,  T , . , )  
(2-25) 
= c,-(w,, r,.,, t, b,,,, T„ T,,,); 
c^, = (1 + r,.,)sf(w,, r,.,, r, b,.,, T,, T,.,) + b,., + T.., 
(2-26) 
= c^,(w,, r,.,, r, b,.,, T., T,.,); 
U, = piogc\ + ( 1 - y5)logc^,(l + r,.,) 
(2-27) 
= U(w,, r,.,, r, b,.,, T,, T,.,). 
We assume that the consimiption of the generation 0 old agent in period 1 is given by 
K** 
c° = (1 + r,)^ + b, + T,. (2-28) 
^0 
^ It is assxuned through-out the rest of the theoretical potion of this dissertation that exogenous variables are 
set in such a way that ±ese restriction hold. In all simulation experiments, the exogenous variables will be 
specifically set to ensure these restrictions hold. 
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Notice from (2-28) that the introduction of a SS system in period 1 may provide the 
generation 0 old agents a potential wealth windfall. That is, as long as ag > 0, the sum of 
the SS benefit and the lump-sum transfer for the generation 0 old consumers is greater 
than zero. When the SS system is run on a fully fimded basis (5=1) and the SSTF is 
invested as either physical or human capital, the generation 1 old are indifferent to 
whether or not the SS system exists in the model economy. 
2.6. Production Technology 
In each period t the economy produces a time-dated good, using physical capital 
and labor input in a production technology which is assumed to take the Cobb-Douglas 
production form 
Y. = F(K„ L,) = AKfL',-", 0<a<l. (2-29) 
Here Yj measures gross national output (GNP) in period t; A measures total factor 
productivity; K, denotes the aggregate physical capital stock of the economy in period t, 
which is assumed to depreciate completely in each period; Lt denotes the aggregate 
effective labor supply of the economy in period t. The production flmction exhibits 
constant-retums-to-scale technology and satisfies the following "Inada conditions": The 
function is continuous, strictly increasing, strictly concave over nonnegative K and L, and 
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twice continuously differentiable over positive K and L. Also, F(K, L) = 0 if either K or L 
is zero, and, for L (K) > 0, (FJ approaches infinity as K (L) approaches zero and 
approaches zero as K (L) approaches infinity. 
The aggregate physical capital stock K, in period t consists of the private physical 
capital stock Kf in period t and the government physical capital stock Kf in period t: 
K ,  =  K f  +  K f ,  ( 2 - 3 0 )  
where the aggregate physical capital stock K] in the initial period 1 is given by 
K, = Kf + Kf = K,'. (2-31) 
The aggregate effective labor supply of the economy in period t is given by 
L, = e.N„ (2-32) 
where N, is the raw labor force in period t which is, in fact, the population of generation t 
young, and e, measures the efficiency per unit of the raw labor force in period t due to 
government human capital investment in the same period. The effective labor stock in 
period 0 is assumed to be equal to the raw labor force in period 0. 
29 
The technology of human capital in period t is postulated in such a way that labor 
efficiency in period t is a flmction of the government's human capital investment in 
period t and the effective labor force in period t - 1. More precisely, the efficiency in 
period t is related positively to the level of human capital investment in period t and 
negatively to the effective labor force in period t - I. The specification of the technology 
is given by 
where X denotes an efficiency parameter. When the value of X increases, human capital 
becomes more productive. Also, by assiunption, H, = 0, which implies that e, = 1. 
Note that, for the same reason, in the complete absence of government human capital 
investment, labor efficiency is always equal to one. 
The profit maximizing behavior of competitive firms is assumed to determine the 
rate of return on physical capital and the effective wage rate in each period t. We assume 
that the labor and physical capital markets continuously clear. That is, labor demanded by 
firms is equal to the effective labor supply and capital is always fully utilized. 
Consequently, physical capital and effective labor are paid in accordance with their 
marginal productivities as follows: 
e, = exp X ( H ,  L , . , )  (2-33) 
(1 + r.) = F^CK,, LJ = QrACK./L.)"-'; (2-34) 
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w. = F,(K„L.) = (1 - or) A(K./L, r ,  (2-35) 
where is the effective wage rate per unit of effective labor in period t. 
Finally the relationship between the effective wage rate, w,, and the wage rate actually 
paid to each generation t young agent, w„ is given by 
2.7. Capital Accumulation 
In the product market the demand for good in each period t needs to be equal to 
the supply in each period for all t > 1. Equivalently, total private saving in period t plus 
the a^ fraction of government saving in period t must equal the physical capital stock in 
period t + 1. Note that government saving in period t consists of government physical and 
human capital investments in period t + 1. The private and government physical capital 
accumulation processes are thus given by 
w. = e,w^. (2-36) 
Kr. , = N.sl-; (2-37) 
Kf., = a,Sf. (2-38) 
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In (2-37) the left hand side is the private physical capital stock in period t + i and the 
right hand side is private saving, the sum of all personal saving in period t. In (2-38) the 
left hand side is the government physical capital stock in period t + 1 and the right hand 
side is the a^ fraction of government saving in period t. 
The government human capital accumulation process is given by 
H,., = (1 - a,)Sf, (2-39) 
where the human capital investment in period t + 1 on the left side is equal to the 
(1 - a^) fraction of government saving in period t on the right side. 
2.8. Definition of Equilibrium 
An equilibrium for the economic model will now be defined. Attention will be 
restricted to equilibria for which the optimal consumption and savings levels of each 
generation t young agent are strictly positive. Given (Kf, Kf = H, =0, N,,, n) and a 
SS system (r, S, a^ satisfying 0 < r, a^, a^ < 1, an equilibrium is a collection 
ofsequences (cf, c°, {v,, SSTF,, G,,T , Sf, b,}'^",and 
iKf, Kf, K,, H,, N,, L;, r,, w,, such that the following conditions hold: 
1. The capital and labor sequences | K,, L, j, ^ , satisfy 
( I  +  r . )  =  a A ( K , / L , ) " - ' ,  V t >  1 ;  
w, = (1 - a) A(K./L,)", Vt> 1, 
where 
w, = e,w,, Vt > 1; 
e ,  =  e x p " " ' V t > l .  
2. The consumption and saving sequences |c,^ c° ,  ^ solve the lifetime utility 
maximization problem faced by each generation t young agent by satisfying 
sf = s'Cw,, r,.,, r, b,.,, T,, T,.,) >0, Vt > 1; 
c; = [I - r]w, +T, - sf > 0, Vt > 1; 
c : . ,  = ( 1  + r . . , ) s r  + b , . ,  + T , . „  V t > I ,  
and the consumption of each generation 0 old agent in period 1 is given by 
= (1 + ^ b, + T,. 
3. Physical and human capital are accumulated by satisfying 
K ^ , = N . s r ,  V t > l ;  
K f . , = a , S f ,  V t > l ;  
K,., = Kl, + Kf.,, Vt> 1, 
where the aggregate physical capital stock in the initial period 1 is given by 
K ,  =  K f  +  K f  =  K f .  
4. The SS system satisfies the following conditions: 
V t =  r w „  V t  >  1 ;  
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SSTF, = Vt>l; 
G, = a SSTF,, Vt>l; 
Sf = (1 - a^)SSTF,, Vt>l; 
T .  =  ^  ,  V t >  1 ;  
N . ,  + N ,  
b = [1 - -f (1 r,.,)Kf., ^ ^ 
N. 
and the SS benefits of each generation 0 old agent, bj, are given by 
^ ^ [1 - ^]v,N,_+ (1 r,)Kf ^ [1 - £]v,N, 
N„ N. *0 
2.9. Equilibrium in a Reduced Per-Capita Form 
Using the above micro-based macroeconomic model, our basic purpose is to 
characterize general equilibriimi and intergenerational equity effects of alternative SS 
systems (r, S, a^, aj. Intergenerational equity consequences can be investigated from 
various viewpoints depending on whether the focus is put on actuarial status within a SS 
system or the relative welfare of generations as measured by lifetime utility. To 
investigate these matters, we first need to investigate the dynamic behavior of physical 
and human capital for the economic model at hand. 
The definition of the physical capital stock (2-30), together with the private and 
government physical capital accumulation processes (2-37) and (2-38), implies that 
K.., = N.sf + a,(l - a^)Sf, (2-40) 
where the initial physical capital stock K, is given by 
K, = K' + Kf = Kf + 0 = K'. (2-41) 
Recalling our assumption that capital depreciates completely at the end of each period, 
the left hand side of (2-40) is net investment in aggregate physical capital in period t -i- 1. 
The first term on the right hand side is the private saving of the generation t young agents 
in period t and the second is the fraction of government saving Sf in period t that results 
in physical capital in period t + 1. 
The physical capital accumulation equation (2-40), the form (2-24) for optimal 
saving, the SS auxiliary conditions (2-7), (2-9), and (2-10), imply that 
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K . - ,  =  N ,  W, -r T, -[l-a,(l -a^)J]rw, -
\ 
I  ^ 1 - 1  
' "'t - I J 
= K(w,, r,.,, sss, b,.,, T,, T,.,), 
(2-42) 
where sss = (t, 5, a^, a^) denotes the SS system. 
Furthermore, eliminating bt^,, Tj, and T,_ , in (2-42) using ±e SS auxiliary 
conditions (2-6)-(2-10) and (2-12)-(2-14), equation (2-42) can further be reduced to 
K. N.d -;ff)ll - rll - (-^^^a^ - a,(I - aj)^ 
V V n + z 
w. /y 
- (n + 1)N, w t  -  I  
1 r,., 
(2-43) 
= K(w,, w,.|, r,.,, sss). 
Finally, using the firm profit maximization conditions (2-34) and (2-35), together 
with the labor force relationship (2-32), the wage relationship (2-33), and the last SS 
auxiliary condition (2-11), the physical capital accumulation equation (2-43) can be 
expressed as follows: 
A(1 - a)(l - p) 
K . - ,  =  N .  
1 - a I 
1 + ^ Ptil - (1 - ^-:ra^)5, 
a V u. -r 2 ^ J 
e , . a [ K a N - ]  
= K(K.,N„e,,sss). 
The physical capital stock in period t + 1 is a function of physical capital stock in 
period t, raw labor in period t, and labor efSciency in period t, which in turn depends on 
physical capital stock in period t -1, raw labor in period t -1, and labor efficiency in 
period t - I. As the efficiency term in each period t is successively substituted out, the 
physical capital stock in period t + 1 is expressed as a function of physical capital and raw-
labor in all previous periods, in addition to labor efficiency ei in period 1.'' Finally 
through a recursive substitution out of physical capital and raw labor over time using (2-
30) and (2-1), the physical capital stock in period t + 1 can ultimately be expressed as a 
function only of exogenously given parameters and initial conditions. Note that, when 
3^=1, implying that there is no government human capital investment over time, the 
physical capital accumulation equation (2-44) reduces to a simple form in which the 
physical capital stock in period t + 1 is a function only of physical capital stock and raw 
labor in period t, in addition to the SS system. That is. 
Recall that Hi = 0 and Lg = Ng > 0. by assumption. Thus, e, = exp(/Ji,/Lo) = 1. 
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K , . ,  =  K ( K , ,  N , ,  s s s ) .  (2-45) 
Let kt denote per capita physical capital in period t, i.e., the ratio (K,/L,) of 
physical capital to effective labor in period t. Let y, denote per capital GNP in period t. 
Dividing both sides of (2-44) by L,., then gives 
= k,.,(k,, e,/e,.,, sss). 
Using (2-33) and various other previously given model relations to substitute out 
the labor efficiency terms in (2-46), the per capita physical capital in period t + 1 can be 
expressed as a function of per capita physical capital in period t and period t - I. Finally 
through the reciu-sive substitution out of past per capita physical capital stocks, per capita 
physical capital stock in period t + 1 can be expressed as a function of the initial per 
capita physical capital in period 1, k,, along with exogenously given initial conditions 
and parameters, where 
k,., = K,.,/L,, 
(n + l/l + —ptfl - (1 
V a V u. + 2 ^ J) 
(2-46) 
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Kf + Kf _ K," 
" e,(H,/L„)(n + l)No " (n + DN^' 
In summary, the evolution of the economy at hand is fully accounted for by the 
per capita version (2-46) of the physical capital accumulation equation (2-44). 




e, =e.(k,..) = > 2; 
6; = 1; 
C = A(1 - Qr)(l - P) 1 - T 1 - + a,(l - a^))J (2-49) 
D = (n + l)|l + - (1 - —^aJcJ 
a n + 1 
The classification of variables for this state equation is as follows: 
Time-t endogenous variable (t > 1): kt+ 
Time-t predetermined variables (t > 3): kt, kt.i; 
(2-50) 
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Kf Exogenous variables:k, = n. A, a, B, r, S, a,, a.; (1 + n)No 
Admissible Conditions: 0 < r, ag, ajj <1, 0< a, /?< 1, 0 < Kf, 0 < NQ, -1 < n. 
Solving (2-48) in each period t > 1, the sequence of the equilibrium per capita 
physical capital stocks {k}| ^  ^ is obtained. Once per capita physical capital stocks are 
determined over time, the equilibrium values for the sequences |c,-, c°, sf ^ , 
{v„ SSTF,, G., T„ Sf, bj"", and {KJ", Kf, K„ H., N., L„ r„ w., can be 
derived using the basic model relationships together with the defining conditions for an 
equilibrium. 
2.10. Mathematical Verification of the Economic Model 
2.10.1. Does the product market clear in each period t? Given private agent 
and firm optimization, and initial aggregate physical and human capital stocks, and the 
definitions of aggregate physical and human capital stocks, the accumulation process 
assumed for capital already implies that the product market clears in each period t > 1. It 
is, however, worth while to see this through mathematical expression for, by doing so, we 
may gain additional understanding about the sequence of equilibrium allocations over 
time. Let C, denote aggregate consumption in period t and let S, denote aggregate saving 
in period t. It then suffices to show that 
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C .  + s .  = Y . ,  t > l ,  ( 2 - 5 1 )  
where product Y, is given by (2-29). 
For any period t > 2, aggregate consumption and saving are given by 
C. = cfN. + cX-. 
= ([1 - r]w, + T, - sf)N, + ((1 + rjsf., +T, + b.)N,., 
= ([1 - 7-]w, - s^N, + ((1 + rJsP., + b,)N,+ G, 
= (w, - sf)N, + (1 + rJCKI" + Kf) - SSTF, + a^SSTF. 
= (w. - sf)N, + (1 + r.)K, - (1 - aJSSTF,; (2-52) 
S. = sfN, + Sf 
= s^N, + (1 - aJSSTF,. (2-53) 
Thus, the sum of aggregate consxmiption and saving in period t is expressed as follows: 
C. + S, = [(w. - s|')N. + (1 + r,)K, - (1 - a^)SSTF,] + 
[sfN, + (1 - a^)SSTFJ 
= w,N, + (1 + r.)K, 
= e,w,N, + (1 + r,)K. 
42 
= ((1 - a)AKrLr)L. - (ciAKr-'L'.-")K, 
= AKfL',-" 
= Y, . (2-54) 
Finally, for period I, aggregate consumption and saving are given by 
C ,  =  c f N ,  +  c r N ^  
= ([1 - r]w, + T, - s^N, + ((1 + r,)K{' +T, + b,)N, 
= ([1 - r]w, - s|')N, + ((1 + rJsP., + b,)No + G, 
= (w, - sf)N, + (1 + r.XK," + Kf) - SSTF, + a^SSTF, 
= (w, - s;')N, + (1 + r,)K, - (1 - ag)SSTF,; (2-55) 
S, = sfN, + Sf 
= sl-N, + (1 - a^)SSTF,. (2-56) 
Thus, the sum of aggregate consumption and saving in period 1 is 
C, + S, = [(w, - s^N, + (1 + r,)K, - (1 - a^)SSTF,] + 
[s^N, + (1 - a^)SSTF,] 
= w,N, + (1 + r,)K, 
43 
e,w,N, + (1 + r,)K, 
w,L, + (1 + r,)K, 
((1 - cr)AKfL7)L, + (aAKf 'L',-")K, 
AKfL' a T \ ' a 
Y. . (2-57) 
It follows from (2-54) and (2-57) that the product market clearing condition is satisfied in 
each period. 
2.10.2. Is the SS system self-financing? For a given SS system (T, 6, a_, a^), we I ^ 
define several measures of the SS system in order to establish a government budget 
constraint. Aggregate SS tax payments in period t are the sum of individual SS tax 
payments in period t. Aggregate SS tax payments in period t, denoted by SSTi, are thus 
given by 
SS revenues in period t are the sum of aggregate SS tax payments in period t and capital 
income in period t accrued from government physical capital investment. SS revenues in 
period t, denoted by SSR„ are thus given by 
SST, = zWjNf (2-58) 
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SSR, = SST, + (1 + rJKf. (2-59) 
Aggregate SS benefits in period t are the sum of individual SS benefits in period t. 
Aggregate SS benefits in period t, denoted by SSB,, are thus given by 
SSB, = b.N,.,. (2-60) 
SS expenditiures in period t are the sum of aggregate SS benefits in period t, government 
redistributive transfer expenditures G, in period t, and government saving Sf in period t. 
SS expenditures in period t, denoted by SSE„ is then given by 
SSE, = SSB, + G, + Sf. (2-61) 
The government's budget constraint in each period t requires that aggregate SS 
revenues SSRj be equal to aggregate SS expenditures SSE„ which can be expressed by 
the simple equation 
KodifofTs government intertemporal budget constraint in his generational accounting can be interpreted 
as "sum of present value of SSR over time = sum of present value of SSE over time." 
On the other hand, the budget constraint of the U.S. SS system is expressed as 
* I _ coc J. SSE, » , SSR, + = SSE, 
1 ft ^ 1 1 + r,. , 
where the length of a period is 75 years and the govenunent use regarding the SSTF is not specified except 
for purchases of U.S. Treasury Securities. See Kotlikoff (1992) and "The annual report of U.S. SS system 
(1996) for respective budget constraint in details. ' f p't-
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SSR, = SSE,, t> 1. (2-62) 
Using the SS auxiliary conditions (2-6)-(2-14), we can show the following 
equalities: For periods t > 2, 
SSE, = SSB, + G, + S, 
= b.N,., + SSTF, 
= [(1 - ^)r]w,N. +(1 + rJKf + SSTF, 
= [(1 - J)r]w,N, +(1 + rJKf + tJzw.N, 
= <5zw,N, +(1 + r,)Kf 
= SST, +(1 + r,)Kf 
= SSR.. (2-63) 
For period t = 1, 
SSE, = SSB, + G, + S, 
= b,No + SSTF, 
= [(1 - <y)r]w,N, + SSTF, 




= SSR,. (2-64) 
It follows from (2-62) and (2-64) that the government budget constraint is 
satisfied over time, which suffices to show that the SS system is self-financing. 
2.11. Nature of Equilibrium 
In Diamond Economy, the existence of a unique stable steady state equilibrium is 
ensured by imposing various regularity conditions, which can be summarized as follows: 
First, for (Walrasian) stability in the capital market the demand curve for (physical) 
capital is assumed to be steeper than the supply curve, implying that, given a positive 
(physical) capital stock in any period t, an increase in the wage rate, w„ in period t 
increases personal saving, sf, in period t and also an increase in the rate of return on 
(physical) capital rt+1 in period t + 1 increases sf. See Diamond (1965, right side of 
Diagram 2, p. 1133). Then, Diamond (1965, Diagram 3, p. 1133) adds another 
assumption 0 < drj ^ , / dr, < 1. 
Can we apply this assmnption to the present economic model to ensure the same 
result? Unfortunately not. It is because the history of our economic model can not be 
traced down as done in the Diamond Economy. That is, in the present economic model, 
the saving function (2-24) in each period t is not expressed in terms of only the wage rate 
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in period t and the rate of return on physical capital in period t + 1. However, the unique 
steady state equilibrium for the economic model at hand can explicitly determined in the 
following way. First, solving the dynamic state equation (2-48) with k, +1 = k,, the steady 
state per-capita physical capital stock k is 
where C is given by (2-49) and D is given by (2-50). 
[Note that, for given parameters and a given SS system (r, S, ag, aj, k is uniquely 
determined.] 
Second, if the derivative (dk,., / dk,) is less than one in absolute value in a 
neighborhood of the unique steady state equilibrium k, then k is locally stable, meaning 
that all equilibrium paths that start with an initial per capita physical capital level k| close 
to k must eventually converge to k. Once a unique steady state per capita physical 
capital stock k is ensured for a given set of initial conditions and basic economic 
parameters, its local stability property is easily proved by using a local linear 
approximation technique for the dynamic state equation (2-48)." 
'' A rough sketch of its proof is as follows; Given admissible exogenously given specifications (p. 40) let 
k > 0 denote the unique stationary solution in the admissible solution set, denoted by V, conditional on the 
C C 





Finally, for the unique stable steady state per-capita physical capital. The steady 
state equilibrium values {c^, c°, f} and { r, w, e, w} can then be derived via the model 
relations and equilibrium conditions. For instance, using (2-34), the steady state 
equilibrium rate of return on physical capital is given by 
a ' I /r\\ r 
la - I r = a Ak" - 1 = trA D V - i  — I - 1=  o rA  
C 
?| - I, (2-66) 
2.12. Features of the Economic Model 
Feature 1: Any steady state equilibrium satisfying f = n for the economic model at hand 
is, by definition, a golden rule equilibrium.'" It can be shown that f = n if and 
only if 
. \ (I - ^)(l - 0) - ^ 
r(l-M<J) = ^ , (2-67) 
I - a 
_ - C -
Z(k) = k ; Z'(k) = — r(k )wi thO <  Z ' (k )  <  1 .  Us ing  Tay lo r ' s  Theorem,  expand  Z(k )  abou t  k  to  
obtain the linear approximation system (LAS) for the BCDE as follows: 
k ,*  ,  =  Z ' (k )Pc  -  k ]  fo rk  == i c .  
Here, since Z' (k) is a positive real number less than 1, 0 is a stable stationary solution for this LAS. 
Noting that 0 is a stable stationary solution for the LAS implies k is a locally stable solution for the 
BCDE relative to the admissible solution set V, this suffices to show that k is locally stable. 
Samuelson (1958) and Diamond (1965) show that, in pure exchange and production overlapping-generations 
model, respectively, decentralized market allocation may be dynamically inefficient, which is originally proved 
by Phelps (1961). 
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where 
M = (1 - /?) n + 1 ,, , 
-a + (1 -a Ja^ 
n + 2 ^ ® + P 1 - n 9 « 
(2-68) 
In particular, in the absence of a SS system (T = 0), r = n if and only if 
7"^ = \ - p. (2-69) 
1 - a 
Feature 2\ As long as the SSTF is invested under a "physical investment only" fiscal 
policy (ag = 0 and a^ = 1), private saving S"* and the SSTF in period t have the 
same effect on capital accumulation over time. Also, as long as government 
saving S® is invested as physical capital K (a^ =1), private saving S" and 
government saving S*^ in period t have the same effect on physical capital 
accumulation over time. 
Feature 2 is obvious because agents are indifferent regarding who does the 
saving'^ as long as the saving yields to the same retum to them. Since a SS arrangement 
(T, 5) is non-distortionary in this case. Feature 2 explains why, when ag = 0 and a^ = 1, the 
See Blanchardand Fischer (1989. p. 111). 
introduction of a fully funded SS system (5 = 
capital accumulation over time. 
1) has no effect on aggregate saving and 
Feature 3: As long as the SSTF is invested under a "physical investment only" fiscal 
policy (a^ = 0 and a^ = 1), a SS system is distinguished only by its effective SS 
tax rate r = r(l - S). The separate values of T and 5 do not matter as long 
as r = r( 1 - J) remains unchanged. 
Clearly, Features 1 and 2 suffice to show why Feature 3 holds. One particular 
implication of Feature 3 is that, roughly put, a SS system with high T and high 5 could be 
equivalent to a SS system with low T and low 6 in the sense that the same dynamic path 
for the per capita physical capital stock results. The choice of the individual SS 
parameters x and 5 matters only when it changes the value of r = r(l - <5). 
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CHAPTERS. SIMULATIONS 
3.1. Key Questions 
The current chapter focuses on the general equilibrium effects of alternative social 
security (SS) systems for the economic model developed in Chapter 2, particularly 
concerning SS ftmding policy and its resulting consequences for intergenerational equit>'. 
Since the economic model is too complex to allow a detailed analytical characterization 
of the economy's responses to changes in SS systems, we compute the dynamic 
equilibrium allocation to determine how different SS systems influence the time paths of. 
for instance, the physical capital/(effective) labor ratio, GNP, and measiures of 
intergenerational equity. 
The simulation approach can, however, pose a potential danger in the sense that a 
simulation result, based on a particular initialization and parameterization of a model, 
may be misleading. More precisely, a simulation study could focus on a certain range of 
parameters to justify a particular point of view. In order to minimize this danger, we first 
raise a series of key questions that will direct the course of the simulation experiments to 
be undertaken. 
Question 1: How will the economy respond to different SS arrangements, from unfunded 
to funded, as characterized by the SS tax rate rand the social security trust 
fund (SSTF) fraction S? 
In a famous debate between Barro (1974) and Feldstein (1974, 1976) on the 
desirability of a SSTF, Barro indicates that the accumulation of the SSTF would be offset 
by a decrease of private saving resulting from rational consumers' super-altruistic 
behavior. The result is that the existence of the SSTF is irrelevant to his model 
economy.'** Feldstein argues that an increase in national saving would occur since the 
incremental SSTF is not fully offset by decreases in private saving. Supporting 
Feldstein's argimient, Aaron, Bosworth, and Burtless (1989) show, in their simulation 
smdy on the U.S. SS system, that a SSTF has a positive effect on the capital stock, raising 
net national product and general consumption levels. 
It is difficult to evaluate these arguments because each argument is based on a 
different set of assumptions, especially regarding the degree of rationality of economic 
agents. Still, this debate clearly provides an example of the difficulty in tracking down 
the economic effects of the SSTF. 
Question 2: How does government fiscal policy regarding the use of the SSTF affect the 
economic model? 
It is often understood that, through the accumulation of the SSTF, some portion of 
the SS taxes contributed by an agent when young is put aside for his own SS benefits 
when old, blocking a shift of resources across generations so that a closer linkage 
For a detailed account of Barro's argument regarding SS system, see Visaggio (1991) and Tabellini 
(1991). 
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between SS taxes and benefits is ensured. This is not necessarily the case for our 
economic model. Rather, we postulate that the SSTF can be used in various ways, 
depending on the government fiscal policy. Specifically, the SSTF can be allocated 
among redistributive transfers, physical capital investment, and human capital 
investment, and we characterize this allocation parametrically in a way that permits all 
possible allocations to be considered. Thus, by construction, the economic impact of the 
SSTF, in whatever amount, depends on what the government does with the SSTF. 
For the U.S. SSTF, this matter was set forth, for example, by Schultze (1990). 
Schultze writes, ".../Ae mere accumulation of financial assets in social security trust 
funds does not mean that one generation is financing its own retirement and relieving the 
next of any burden" Our concern is to analyze the economic and intergenerational 
equity consequences of alternative SS systems with government behavior regarding the 
use of the SSTF incorporated into the formal analysis. 
Although there is no particular reason why the specification of government fiscal 
policy should be limited, we pay particular attention to the following special cases: 
Case I: Government physical capital investment only policy (ag = 0, a^ = 1.0); 
Case II: Government redistributive transfer only policy (ag = 1.0); 
Case in: Government human capital investment only policy (ag = a,j = 0); 
Case rV: Policy-mix: (ag = .5, a^ = 1.0). 
See Schultze (1990. p. 10). 
Question 3: How useful is the SS actuarial status of an individual agent as a measure of 
intergenerational equity? If it is not useful, what alternative measure might 
be employed? 
SS actuarial status, defined as the ratio of the present value of SS benefits 
received to taxes paid, explains whether or not a SS arrangement is actuarially favorable 
for a particular generation. Note that the term is simply another way of expressing net 
social security wealth (NSSW)'^, defined as the net present value of the SS benefits 
received minus the SS taxes paid. Also, when SS taxes are replaced by wage income, the 
term becomes the usual replacement rate, the ratio of SS benefits received to wage 
income.'^ 
Although SS actuarial status is one standard measure used in the analysis of SS 
systems, there is a question often left out—whether or not SS actuarial status is an 
effective measure of intergenerational equity. We provide an alternative measure firom a 
lifetime utility perspective, referred to as relative welfare benefit (RWB), by which the 
comparison of intergenerational equity is possible over varying SS arrangements across 
periods. 
See Feldstein (1974). 
" For instance, Musgrave (1981) introduces the "fixed relative position, a fixed ratio between per-capita 
income (wage income) and the per-capita benefits of the old (b,^ |/wj. Also, Miguel-Angel and Lopez-
Garcia defines the "net replacement rate", a ratio between net wage income when young and SS benefits 
when young. 
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Question 4: What are the consequences of alternative SS arrangements and government 
uses of the SSTFfor intergenerational equity measured in terms of the time 
profiles of the SS actuarial status and RWB? Does a build-up of the SSTF 
necessarily improve intergenerational equity in terms of either these two 
measures? 
In recent studies of SS systems, discussion of intergenerational equity 
consequences has tended to be constrained in the following ways: First, only two polar 
SS arrangements (pay-as-you-go and fully funded) are considered; second, a certain 
narrowly defined use of the SSTF (Case I) is assumed; and, third, some variant of SS 
actuarial status is used to measure intergenerational equity. These constraints often lead 
to the following view regarding intergenerational equity consequences: a pay-as-you-go 
SS arrangement is an income redistribution scheme across generations while a fully 
funded SS arrangement breaks this intergenerational link. Obviously, this view does not 
capture the potential intergenerational equity consequences which can exist when a wide 
range of SS arrangements and varying government uses of the SSTF are considered. 
For instance, consider an imaginary study of the U.S. SS system in which the 
SSTF is assumed to yield the rate of return on physical capital (Case I). Noting that the 
actual U.S. SSTF is saved in the form of U.S. Treasury Securities (U.S. government 
bonds), the assumption necessarily implies that the U.S. government expenditure of the 
revenues accrued from issuing these securities is included as physical capital investment 
in the U.S. national account. In short, the view posits that the U.S. government bonds are 
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capitalized into an equity claim. Is this the case with the real U.S. economy? Could the 
intergenerational equity consequences derived in the study be the U.S. experience? Our 
approach can be understood in the following context: We modify the imaginary study in 
such a way that it captures other possible U.S. government uses of the SSTF, including a 
18 further differentiation of its capitalization method. 
Question 5: If there is any meaningful relationship(s) between the size and use of the 
SSTF and intergenerational equity, how does it depend on structural aspects 
of the model economy such as the population growth rate, labor share, and 
consumption time preference? 
For instance, there is a notion that a decrease in the population growth rate is 
unfavorable for a less funded SS arrangement. A lower population growth rate decreases 
the ratio of retired population to working population (the dependency ratio), and, as the 
population growth rate decreases, the implicit rate of return on less funded SS taxes tends 
to be less attractive. When this comparison is restricted to the two polar SS arrangements, 
pay-as-you-go and fully funded, the notion indicates that, for a lower population growth 
rate, a fully funded SS arrangement is preferred to pay-as-you-go. 
This may not necessarily the case with our economic model. This is mainly 
because a change in the population growth rate alters equilibrium relative prices such as 
18 For a detailed account of this, see, for example, Eisner (1989) and Blanchard and Fischer (1989). A 
similar point is discussed in Kotlikoff (1992). Eisner recapitulates some principal facts in the U.S. national 
accoimting system, one of which is that part of the U.S. debt is capitalized into, for example, human 
capital. 
the real wage rate and the rate of return on physical capital by changing the ratio of 
physical capital to (effective) labor. As Blanchet and Kessler (1991) indicate, excessive 
fimding, coupled with an increase of the physical capital/(effective) labor ratio, may lead 
to a decreasing rate of return on physical capital; thus, a more funded SS arrangement is 
not necessarily preferable. 
3.2. Computation of an Equilibrium Allocation 
To operationalize our economic model, we first need to specify values for 
(KJ", Kf, H,, No, n). Throughout all simulations except those in Section 3.8, the 
following values are maintained. The size, NQ, of the population of generation 0 old 
agents in the initial period 1 is set at 1. The net population growth rate, n, is taken to be 
.012, so that the population is increasing over time. The size, N,, of the population of 
generation 1 young agents in period 1 is then given by (1 + n). The private physical 
capital stock in period 1 is given by .25 and is assumed to be purely owned by the 
generation 0 old agents. The government physical and himian capital stocks in period 1 
are each assumed to be 0, indicating that the SS system is implemented at the beginning 
of period 1. The efficiency, 6], in period 1 is then given by 1 since no government human 
capital investment takes place in period 1. 
We arbitrarily choose the following values for the parameters (a, P, A, k) 
characterizing the production and utility flmctions. The share of physical capital in 
production, a, is set at .3. The technology factor. A, is taken to be 1, implying that there 
is no technological progress. The consumption time preference in the utility function, p, 
is set at .5 meaning that an economic agent in our economic model is indifferent to the 
timing of his consumption as long as the present value of his consumption remains 
unchanged. Finally, we examine two different values of efficiency, 1 and 3, for the 
efficiency parameter k. When the value is 1, the productivity of human capital is low; 
when the value is 3, it is high. 
Given the above initialization and parameterization of oiu- economic model, we 
compute the equilibrium allocation through an algorithmic process. This process turns out 
be simple because, as seen in Chapter 2, the equations describing the dynamic 
equilibrium allocation of our model reduce to a single basic causal difference equation (2-
48). Using this equation, the time path of the physical capital/(effective) labor ratio is 
obtained, and, once this is done, equilibrium values for all the other endogenous 
economic variables (in each relevant period) can be derived by straightforward 
calculation. It should be particularly noted that the efficiency level e,+, in period t + 1 
can be expressed as a flmction of per capita physical capital in period t. 
For a given configiui^tion of the initial conditions and parameters, a given SS 
arrangement (T, 5), and a given government fiscal policy (ag, a^), a collection of 
sequences {cf, c", {v,, SSTF,, G.,T, Sf, b,}|^",and 
Kl", Kf, K,, H,, Nj, L,, r,, w,, ^ is computed using the following algorithm: 
Step 1: Start with the particular set of initial conditions and the particular values for the 
parameter values characterizing the production and utility fixnctions described 
above. 
Step 2: Set admissible values for the SS arrangement parameters, r and 5, and the 
government fiscal policy parameters, a^ and ai^. 
Step 3: Obtain the per capita physical capital in period 1 and the efficiency per unit of 
raw labor in period 2 as follows: 
K," + Kf ^ K," ^ Kf 
L, e,(H„No)N, ~ (1 + n)No' 
e, = e,(k,) = 
Step 4: Use equation (2-48) to calculate the equilibrium values for k2 in period 2 and the 
efficiency level e3 for period 3. 
Step 5: Using relevant conditions appeared in the equilibrium presentation (Section 2.8), 
derive the corresponding equilibrium values for the endogenous variables. 
Step 6: Repeat steps 4 and 5 with k3 in place of k2 and e4 in place of 63. 
Step 7: Repeat Step 6 for successive values kt and e,+1 until a designated period is 
reached or until convergence to a steady state allocation is achieved. 
3.3. Measures of Welfare Benefit and Intergenerational Equity 
Given any social security (SS) system, let its arrangement parameters (x, 5) and 
government fiscal policy parameters (a^, a^) be abbreviated by F = (t, 5) and O = (a^, a^). 
Our measure of the welfare benefit WBt associated with switching from one SS 
arrangement (Fg, OQ) to another arrangement (F,, O,) in a particular period t is defined as 
the (normalized) utility that a generation t young agent gains or looses by the switch: 
WB, ((Fo, Oo), (F„ O,)) = u; (F„ O,) - U; (Fo, Oo), (3-1) 
where U' = 100-U, + 200. The reason for using normalized utility is clarified below. 
As the equity debate in an intergenerational context attracts growing attention, the 
term "intergenerational equity" is used more frequently. To avoid confiision, it is 
important to provide a quantitative definition of the term. One possibility is to assume 
that the intergenerational equity aspect of a SS system is evaluated by whether or not the 
SS benefits received by each generation exceed the SS taxes they paid, in present value 
terms, and by how much. For each generation t, define 0t to be the ratio of the present 
value of the SS benefits received in period t + 1, b,+ ,/(l + rt+,), to the SS tax payment in 
period t, rwj, for a representative generation t young agent: 
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0 (1 (3-2) 
TW 
The plot of 0t over time then provides a way of assessing intergenerational equity. If 0t is 
greater than 1, the SS system is said to be actuarially favorable for generation t, and if 
less than 1, unfavorable. When 0t is one, the SS system is said to be actuarially fair for 
generation t. Once the time profiles of 0t associated with different SS systems are 
obtained, we can evaluate the extent to which a switch in systems improves the actuarial 
status of generations t > 1. 
An alternative measure of intergenerational equity will now be defined in terms of 
lifetime utility. Let RWBt denote the relative welfare benefit that a generation t young 
agent gains or losses by a swatch in SS systems: 
where the use of normalized utility ensures that the denominator is always positive for the 
range of parameter values used in this study and, during the course of the entire 
simulations, the same base case is used to derive U* (FQ , OQ ); namely, a particular 
parameterized version of the economic model in which there is no SS system. 
RWB.CCFo, OJ, (r,, O,)) = u;(r,,o,) -u;(ro. Op) 
u;(r„, cDj (3-3) 
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The time profile of RWBj then provides an alternative way to measure 
intergenerational equity. In particular, given a switch in SS systems, one can use this time 
profile to see which generations experience a gain in lifetime utility and which a loss. 
3.4. Unfunded Social Security Tax Policy and Actuarial Status 
The economic model in the absence of a SS system was first run as a base case. 
The main results of the base case run are reported in Table 3.1. Immediately apparent 
from Table 3.1 is that the physical capital/labor ratio decreases over time in a monotone 
fashion until its stationary value, .2194, is reached. The monotone decrease of per-capita 
physical capital stock up to the stationary value can be explained partly by the complete 
depreciation assumption and partly by the choice of initial physical capital stock. 
Given the monotone decrease of the per capita capital stock, the corresponding 
time paths of the (effective) wage rate, the rate of retum on the physical capital, and per-
capita GNP are monotone as well. Up to the respective steady state values, .4441, -.1326, 
and .6344, the effective wage rate decreases, the retum rate on the physical capital 
increases, and per-capita GNP increases in a monotone fashion. The absence of a SS 
system in the basic model economy implies that there exists no human capital investment. 
As a result, in each period t > 1 both the wage rate and the effective wage rate are the 
same, and the effective labor supply is equal to the generation t population. These 
obvious observations are not reported in Table 3.1. 
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Table 3.1: Equilibrium of the economic model in the absence of a social security system 
—T = 0, n = .012, A = 1.0, a = .3, p = .5 
Period N. K I". c:.. y. GNP, u. u; 
1 1.012 .2470 -.2016 .4602 .2301 .2301 .1947 .6574 .6653 -1.553 44.71 
2 1.024 .2274 -.1539 .4489 .2244 .2244 .1932 .6412 .6646 -1.569 43.10 
3 1.036 .2218 -.1390 .4455 .2228 .2228 .1928 .6365 .6676 -1.574 42.61 
4 1.049 .2201 -.1345 .4445 .2223 .2223 .1927 .6350 .6741 -1.575 42.47 
5 1.061 .2196 -.1332 .4442 .2221 .2221 .1926 .6346 .6817 -1.576 42.42 
6 1.074 .2195 -.1327 .4441 .2221 .2221 .1926 .6345 .6897 -1.576 42.41 
7 1.087 .2194 -.1326 .4441 .2221 .2221 .1926 .6344 .6980 -1.576 42.40 
8 1.100 .2194 -.1326 .4441 .2221 .2221 .1926 6344 .7063 -1.576 42.40 
9 1.113 .2194 -.1326 .4441 .2220 .2220 .1926 6344 .7148 -1.576 42.40 
10 1.127 .2194 -.1326 .4441 .2220 .2220 .1926 6344 .7234 -1.576 42.40 
For the steady state per-capita physical capital value, however, GNP is a non-
stationary with a deterministic trend which is equal to the gross population growth rate. 
(1+n), as can be verified through simple mathematics using the economic model 
equations. In each period t, the consumption level of generation t young consumer is 
equal to the present value of his consumption level when old due to the equal weight 
given to each period's consumption decision (P = .5). The only reason why the old 
consumption level increases while the young consumption level decreases up to their 
stationary values is that, as the per capita physical capital stock decreases over time, the 
rate of return on physical capital increases. 
Not surprisingly, but difficult to explain, the lifetime utility of the generation t 
young agent decreases with t until its stationary value, 42.40, is reached. The explanation 
for this result depends on general equilibrium relative price effects. For this reason, the 
detailed interpretation of this result is put aside until after relative price effects have been 
examined. A general intuitive explanation however can be given as follows: In this 
particular run, detrimental effects from the decrease of the wage rate due to the decrease 
of the per capita physical capital stock may dominate beneficial effects from the increase 
of the return rate on physical capital due to the decrease of per capita physical capital 
stock and the corresponding increase of individual saving. Notice that the lower level of 
the per capita physical capital stock does not necessarily lead to lower lifetime utility. 
The decrease in lifetime utility is due partly to the choice of a logarithmic utility function, 
and partly to the choice of the initial capital stock. 
It is useful to look at the time-series data in Table 3.1 graphically, especially since 
the economic model happens to be deterministic. As Kydland and Prescott (1996, p. 75) 
explain, this is mainly because what is mostly relevant in this deterministic economic 
model lies in the comparison of one equilibrium path with another. Figure 3.1 shows 10 
observations of per-capita physical capital stock covering period 1 to period 10 for x = 0. 
The vertical axis measures the per capita physical capital stock and the horizontal axis 
measures time. In the absence of a SS system (T = 0), the decrease in the per-capita 
physical capital stock is seen to be strictly monotone. Likewise, the time path of gross 
national product (GNP), the net rate of retiun on physical capital, and the implicit rate of 
return on SS tax contributions are also depicted in Figure 3.1(b), 3.1(c), 3.1(d), 
respectively. One important implication of Figure 3.1 is that, for the given population 
growth rate, the introduction of a SS system does not change a basic property of 
equilibrium paths in per capita form: namely, their convergence to a steady state. A 
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Figure 3.1: Time paths of key variables as the SS tax policy T changes 0 to .4 
--5 = 0;n = .012, A= 1.0, a = .3, p = .5 
Simulations were then conducted to determine how different SS tax rates T in a 
pay-as-you-go SS system (5 = 0) influence the economic model, particularly, the time 
profiles of intergenerational equity measures. Table 3.2 simmiarizes the economic 
model's steady state responses to changes in the SS tax rate r for the x values {0, .1, .3, 
.4}. The time paths of the per capita physical capital stock and gross national product 
(GNP), in addition to two rates of return, are reported in Figure 3.1. Time profiles of SS 
actuarial status G, and lifetime utility are depicted in Figure 3.2. 
A relatively small SS tax rate (T = .1) decreases generation t private saving in each 
period t, which should be considered as one of the most important economic aspects of 
these simulations for a pay-as-you-go SS system. The result itself seems to be 
conceptually obvious; part of generation t private saving in period t is replaced by SS 
benefits in period t + 1 which is directly transferred from SS tax contributions made by 
generation t + I young agents. It does not, however, necessarily imply that its explanation 
is consequently easy, particularly in this general equilibrium context. 
Upon the implementation of a pay-as-you-go SS system with T = .1, reduced 
disposable income in period t and a new source of old age income, SS benefits in period 
t+I, both have depressing effects on generation t saving in period t. However, if these 
depressing effects result in a reduced aggregate saving level in each period t, then the 
resulting rise in the rate of return on physical capital in period t + 1 tends to encourage 
generation t young personal saving in period t, and the resulting fall in wage rate in 
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Table 3.2: Steady state equilibrium and intergenerational equity for the economic model 
under alternative unfunded SS policies x 
—n = .012, A = 1.0, g = .3, P = .5 
Variable ro(.o, .0) r,(.i,o) r:(.2, 0) 0) r,(.4. 0) 
ic .2194 .1612 .1182 .0859 0.061 
r -.1326 .0763 .3373 .6729 1.120 
w .4441 .4049 .3689 .3351 .3028 
V 0 .0405 .0738 .1005 .1211 
b 0 .0410 .0747 .1018 .1226 
s" .2220 .1632 .1196 .0869 .0619 
C- .2220 .2012 .1755 .1477 .1197 
C° .1926 .2166 .2347 .2471 .2539 
y .6344 .5784 .5270 .4788 .4325 
u -1.576 -1.567 -1.595 -1.655 -1.747 
42.40 43.35 40.51 34.48 25.34 
WB 0 .945 -1.892 -7.920 -17.070 
b / V  - 1.012 1.012 1.012 1.012 
0 - .9403 .7568 .6049 .4773 
RWB 0 .0223 -.0446 -.1868 -.4026 
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period t 1 has a similar effect on the private saving through a reduction of the SS 
benefits in period t + 1. 
However, as long as equiUbrium relative prices are time-invariant, for instance, in 
a steady state solution, the explanation is clear-cut. By definition, steady state individual 
saving f is the steady state per capita physical capital stock multiplied by the population 
growth rate, s" = (1 + n)k , under a pay-as-you-go SS system. In order to ascertain the 
impact of variations in SS tax rate, T, on steady state per capita physical capital stock, k, 
it is enough to conduct a comparative static analysis of the change in k with respect to x. 
The sign of dk/dx is unambiguously negative.'^ Consequently, s" decrease as well. 
Furthermore, noting firom Figure 3.1 that the time paths for the per capita physical capita 
stock corresponding to different x values are monotone decreasing and do not intersect 
each other, we can verify that the pay-as-you-go SS system results in a crowding out of 
both saving and per capita physical capital formation over time for the indicated 
maintained parameter values. 
When the SS system is arranged on a pay-as-you-go basis (5 = 0), k is given by k = 
1 - a 
-1 DV 
I - O 
C = A(1 - aXl - PXl - X) and D'= (n + 1)^ 1 + 
a 
/?r . Then, we have 
dk 
dx (a - 1) 
rp'6D' r)i5C' l(o-i 
j di ' ^  dx I 
\ C )  L C'= J < 0, noting that 
cC- < = -A( l  -  a)( l  -  p)  < 0,  = (1 -  n)^-^p > 0 and(a- 1)<0. 
'CT CT a 
where 
Once the nature of the time path for the per capita physical capital stock is 
explained, there is no surprise regarding the time variation of GNP: The level of GNP 
decreases monotonically over time but constancy of the physical capital/labor ratio in 
steady state implies that GNP grows at the same rate, (1 + n). hi short, the economic 
growth rate is independent of T. That is, x has an only level effect. The introduction of a 
pay-as-you-go SS system with a relatively small SS tax rate (x = .1), however, increases 
lifetime utility in each period t relative to the base case with no SS system, implying that 
this particular arrangement is dynamically Pareto improving. It is tempting to conclude 
from these observations that a pay-as-you-go SS arrangement tends to resolve a problem 
of over-accumulation in the per capita physical capital stock. Although there is nothing 
wrong with this explanation, it could be potentially misleading in the sense that, for other 
parameter values, it might also have caused a problem of under-accumulation in the per-
capita physical stock. For this reason, we interpret, for the moment, the result as follows; 
balancing out positive and detrimental relative price effects, the economy as a whole can 
benefit fi-om the introduction of a pay-as-you-go SS system with a relatively small SS tax 
rate (x = .1). 
Consider, instead, the following question: How is it possible that the lifetime 
utility of each generation t agent increases with the introduction of a SS system with x = 
. 1 while his income in period t decreases and per-capita GNP decrease in both in period t 
and t + 1 ? Are these two facts reconcilable with each other? Although this question 
obviously scales down the question of why Pareto improvement results with the 
introduction of the SS arrangement with T = .1, answering the question may provide a 
clue regarding this Pareto improvement. Let us take a look at the beneficial effects of the 
decrease in the per capita physical capital stock. One obvious beneficial effect is that, as 
the rate of return on individual saving rises, the generation t old agent's income in period 
t + 1 increases. One detrimental effect is that the fall in the wage rate in period t directly 
depresses the generation t young agent's disposable income. 
There is one more unsettling effect, which is determined by comparing the rate of 
return on physical capital in period t + 1 to the rate of retmn on the SS tax contributions 
of the generation t young agent in period t. [Note that, in a pure exchange overlapping 
generations economy, this comparison is irrelevant because of the absence of physical 
capital.] The latter rate of return is given by the SS benefits received in period t +1 
divided by the taxes paid in period t. The time path of (bt + is depicted in Figure 
3.1(d). The implicit rate of return on SS tax payments in period t is simply the population 
growth rate multiplied by the wage growth rate between period t and t + 1, which, in 
steady state, is equal to the biological growth rate. Notice that, when 5 = 0 and the SS 
actuarial status 0, in period t is multiplied by the gross rate of return on physical capital in 
period t + 1, it becomes the impHcit rate of return. 
Consequently, if 0, is greater than one, then saving through the SS system 
dominates personal saving in the sense of providing a higher rate of return, implying that 
01 has a positive effect on lifetime utility. If 0, is less than one, the reverse conclusion 
holds. The effects on 0, of alternative SS systems are given in Table 3.2 for the steady 
state case and Figure 3.2(a) for the dynamic case. The time profiles for 0, in Figure 3.2(a) 
look strange because the value of 0, remains constant over time.'° The point is, the value 
of the actuarial status 0, for a pay-as-you-go SS system with T = .1 is always less than 
one, implying that saving through SS tax payments is dominated by private saving and 
thus has a negative effect on each generation t agent's lifetime utility in each period t. 
However, this lack of dominance is not enough to establish that the introduction of the SS 
system to an economy currently without a SS system would be harmful because it ignores 
the effects of the introduction on physical capital accumulation and hence on the wage 
rage W; and the rate of return on physical capital Indeed, as shown in Figure 3.2(b), 
lifetime utility is acmally higher in every period t for T = .1 than T = 0. 
Now we can reconcile the seemingly contradictory facts that the lifetime utility of 
1 
a generation t consumer increases in moving from x = 0 while his income when young 
As far as a pay-as-you-go SS arrangement is concerned, the time-invariance of 0, for a given T can be 
verified analytically. That is, for a given 5 = 0, 0, is given by 
b. 
0. = r ^ (by(3-2)) 
v . l l  +  r , . , )  
(1 + n)w,., 
' (by (2-6) and (2-13)) (1 + r , . , ) w ,  
(1 + n)(l - a)k,., 
ak^ 
(1 + n)(l - g) C 
a D 
(by (2-25) and (2-34)) 
(by (2-68)) 
Here noting that both C, (2-69), and D, (2-70), are constant over time we can easily see the constancy of a 
pay-as-you-go SS actuarial status over time. 
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and per-capita GNP decrease. These are reconcilable as long as the beneficial effects of 
the decrease in the per capita physical stock, such as the rise in the rate of return on 
individual saving, dominate the detrimental effects, such as the decrease in the wage rate 
and the lower rate of return on SS tax payments relative to the rate of return on physical 
capital. The simulation results for a SS arrangement with t = 0 show that this is the case 
for the particular parameter configmations studied in Figure 3.2. It is not, however, 
particularly important to our study whether these facts can co-exist or not. What draws 
our attention most is that the introduction of a pay-as-you-go SS system with t = . 1 has, 
on the one hand, a detrimental effect on individual welfare from a static "within SS 
system" perspective, while on the other hand it is also a Pareto improvement. The fact 
that the introduction of a Pareto improving pay-as-you-go SS system, even with a 
positive population growth rate, can result in an SS acmarial loss, has important political 
implications, since the political popularity of a change in a SS system often depends on 
its effects on SS actuarial status. 
To explore this point further, we simulate different SS tax schemes in the context 
of a pay-as-you-go system (5 = 0). Table 3.2 displays steady state simulation results. Note 
in particular that the change in the SS tax rate affects the magnitude of the steady state 
gain or loss in welfare benefits WB, 
WB(t = .1) > WB(T = 0) > WB(T = .2) > WB(T = .3) > WB(T = .4). 
This ordering provides important evidence bearing on the question of why the 
introduction of the SS system with tax rate T = .1 is welfare improving, at least in the 
context of the steady state. The SS tax scheme with T = .2 turns out to be welfare-
deteriorating compared to the base case t = 0 with no SS system and to the case t = .1. 
This clearly suggests that, in steady state, the economy experiences an over-accumulation 
of physical capital in the absence of a SS system and an under-accumulation of physical 
capital in a pay-as-you-go SS system with x = .2. In particular, it appears that the 
introduction of a pay-as-you-go SS system with x = .1 alleviates the problem of physical 
capital over-accumulation process, without pushing the economy so far as to cause a 
severe under-accumulation problem. 
Then, what specification of the SS tax rate would resolve the capital accumulation 
problem in our economic model completely for the ciurent set of parameter values? Or, in 
short, what is the optimal SS tax rate in the current setting? As is widely-known, it 
depends on the choice of generational welfare function. In order to avoid this choice 
problem, we will arbitrarily suppose that the government's objective in implementing a 
SS system is to ensure a Pareto optimal steady state allocation for the economy, which in 
turn requires that this steady state allocation be the golden rule allocation. As discussed in 
Chapter 2, this golden rule allocation is achieved if and only if the net rate of return on 
physical capital is equal to the net population growth rate n. 
Using (2-69) (Feature 1 in Section 2.12), the Pareto optimal SS tax policy can be 
obtained as a matter of calculation. For the currently maintained parameter values, it is, 
approximately, T* = .0714. Indeed, the Pareto optimal SS tax rate explains the simulation 
results of lifetime utility gain or loss over different specifications of the SS tax rate. That 
is, a SS tax rate T = .1 is the closest tested tax rate to the Pareto optimal SS tax rate. 
However, although the pay-as-you-go tax scheme with x = .1 leads to the highest level of 
steady state lifetime utility, it needs to be decreased slightly down to ensure a steady state 
golden rule allocation. In other words, under-accumulation of the steady state per capita 
physical capital stock occurs at T = .1 and needs to be corrected by lowering the SS tax 
rate a little bit. Specifically, the net rate of return on physical capital with x = .1, .07625, 
is higher than the golden rule rate, which is given by the net population growth rate .012. 
The time profile of actuarial status Gj shows whether or not a SS system is 
favorable fi-om a 'within SS system' view. As Figure 3.2(a) shows, a lower SS tax rate 
yields a higher value of 0t in each period t: 
e, (T = . 1) > e,(T = .2) > 0,(T = .3) > 0,(T = .4). 
The ordering is explained by the fact that an increase in SS tax rate crowds out per capita 
physical capital stock. In steady state, relative prices remain constant over time and, thus, 
the only relevant variables for the determination of 0, are the population growth rate and 
the rate of return on physical capital. As the SS tax rate increases, the rate of return on 
physical capital increases, too, due to the crowding out of per capita physical capital 
stock. For the given exogenous population growth rate, this implies that the SS system 
becomes less favorable as the SS tax rate increases. Moreover, Figure 3.2(a) reveais that 
the SS tax contribution over time is in any case dominated by personal saving in terms of 
rate of return; hence, measured solely in terms of SS actuarial status, all the SS 
arrangements here are unfavorable. 
As indicated in Table 3.2, in steady state, 0 and WB give the same ranking for 
SS tax schemes. However, an actuarially unfavorable SS arrangement with T = . I yields a 
higher level of lifetime utility than the case T = .1 with no SS system. This point clearly 
raises a question whether or not actuarial status is an effective measure of the desirability 
of a SS system. As discussed, the size of 0, may affect lifetime utility, but it is not the 
sole factor that affects lifetime utility. Indeed, the orderings of WB and 0 indicate that 
this is the case. This can be better explained in a dynamic context. In period 1, a higher 
level of lifetime utility for a generation 1 consumer does not necessarily correspond to a 
greater value of 0). That is, as Figure 3.2(b) shows, the ordering of WB, in period 1 is as 
follows; 
WB,(T = .3) > WB,(T = .2) > WB,(T = .4) > WB,(T = .1) > WB,(x = .0). 
It is often conceived that one of the potential gains of a pay-as-you-go SS system 
is the so called "positive growth dividend," meaning that, if there are more workers than 
retirees, the implicit net rate of return on SS tax payments is positive: A positive 
population growth rate enables each agent to receive larger benefits when old than what 
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he paid in as SS taxes when young. This view is, first, too simple, and, second, even 
erroneous. Figiire 3.2(a) shows that, as the wage rate decreases due to the crowding out 
effect of a positive SS tax rate on per capita physical capital (namely, the wage 
congestion effect), the net rate of return on SS tax payments could be negative: Even with 
an increasing population economy, the present value of SS benefits tends to be less than 
the present value of SS tax payments. 
An overall implication of the simulation results is that a positive population 
growth rate may not necessarily malfe a pay-as-you-go SS arrangement more preferable 
to other types of SS arrangements. The reason for this cannot be seen from looking only 
at SS actuarial status 0,: It is due to the fact that a pay-as-you-go SS arrangement may not 
have any particular advantage for tuning the per capita physical stock to an appropriate 
level. This again, raises the question of whether or not SS actuarial status 0 is an effective 
measure of intergenerational equity. The simulation results illustrate why SS actuarial 
status is not sufficient to reflect the gain or loss of lifetime utility associated with a switch 
from one SS system to another. 
I 
3.5. Social Security Funding Policy and Intergenerational Equity 
Case I: ag = 0 and a^ = 1.0 
So far we have been considering pay-as-you-go SS arrangements (5 = 0). From 
the simulation results, we are led to doubt that actuarial status 0 is an effective measure of 
intergenerational equity for such arrangements. We, now, have the task of considering 
alternative SS funding policies 5 and their resulting consequences for intergenerational 
equity measured in terms of 0 and RWB. First the SSTF is assumed to be invested 
entirely as physical capital in the production technology (Case I: a^ = 0 and a^ = 1.0). The 
simulations are rerun with different SS funding policies for a given SS tax policy T = .2. 
The SS flmding policy 5 can vary from 0 (pay-as-you-go) to 1.0 (fully funded). Figures 
3.3 and 3.4 summarize the simulation results obtained for dynamic equilibrium paths, and 
Table 3.3 contains steady state equilibrium values of some important variables and 
welfare measures. 
Figure 3.3(a) clearly shows that an increase in 5, and hence in the relative size of 
the SSTF, increases the per capita physical capital stock in each period t and, accordingly, 
decreases its rate of return. This crowding-in of per capital stock due to the increase of the 
SSTF fraction 5 for the given government fiscal policy (a^ = 0, and a^ = 1.0) can be 
explained in many ways. One is through a comparative dynamic analysis of the changes 
in the level of k of per capital physical capital with respect to changes in 5, as was done 
with respect to SS tax policy in Section 3.4. The other is through Feature 3 in Section 
2.12. Feature 3 notes that, when ag = 0 and \ = 1.0, an increase in the SS funding policy 
5 is equivalent to a decrease in the SS tax rate x as long as the effective tax rate t* = t( 1 -
5) remains imchanged. Thus, the discussion in Section 3.4 there explaining why 
crowding-out of the per capita physical capital stock results from an increase in the SS 
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Table 3.3: Steady state equilibrium and intergenerational equity for the economic model 
under alternative SS funding policies 5: Case I (ag = 0, a^ = 1.0) 
—n = .012, A = 1.0, a = .3, p = .5 
Variable r(.2, .0) r(.2, .2) r(.2, .4) r(.2, .6) r(.2, .8) r(.2, 1.0) no. 0) 
k .1182 .1339 .1516 .1715 .1939 .2194 .2194 
r .3373 .2254 .1237 .0309 -.0543 -.1326 -.1326 
w .3689 .3830 .3975 .4124 .4279 .4441 .4441 
V .0738 .0766 .0795 .0825 .0856 .0888 0 
SSTF' 0 .0153 .0318 .0495 .0685 .0888 0 
b .0747 .0808 .0840 .0844 .0821 .0770 0 
s" .1196 .1202 .1216 .1240 .1278 .1332 .2220 
s® 0 .0153 .0318 .0495 .0685 .0888 0 
s" .1196 .1355 .1534 .1735 .1963 .2220 .2220 
c^ .1755 .1862 .1964 .2059 .2192 .2220 .2220 
c° .2347 .2281 .2207 .2123 .2029 .1926 .1926 
y .5270 .5471 .5678 .6718 .6114 .6344 .6344 
u -.1595 -1.580 -1.569 -1.565 -1.567 -1.576 -1.576 
0* 40.51 42.05 43.05 43.49 43.30 42.40 42.40 
WB -1.89 -.36 .65 1.09 0.90 0 0 
b / V  1.012 1.055 1.057 1.023 .9590 .8674 -
0 .7568 .8607 .9404 .9927 1.014 1.000 -
RWB -.0446 -.0083 .0153 .0257 .0212 0 0 
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Figure 3.3(a) also provides an example illustrating why, when a^ = 0 and a,^ = 1.0. 
having no SS system (x = 0) is equivalent to having a fully flmded SS system in the 
economic model at hand. When the SSTF is used entirely for physical capital investment, 
the introduction of a fiilly funded SS system is irrelevant because the time path of per 
capita physical capital is not affected by this introduction. This is because agents do not 
differentiate among types of saving as long as the saving yields them the same rate of 
return (Feature 2 in Section 2.12). Figure 3.3(a) also shows that the two distinct SS 
arrangements r(.2, .2) and r(.3, .6) yield the same time path for per capita physical 
capital. Roughly put, a SS arrangement with low x and low 5 can be equivalent to a SS 
arrangement with high x and high 5. This happens whenever the effective SS ta.x rate 
X = x(l - 5) is the same for these SS arrangements (Feature 3 in Section 2.12). Note 
that this effective SS tax rate is .12 for each of the SS arrangements r(.2, .4) and r(.3. .6). 
The implicit rate of return on SS tax payments, defined as the ratio of SS benefits 
received to SS taxes paid, is closely related to various economic rates such as the wage 
and population growth rates and the rate of return on physical capital, in addition to the 
SSTF fraction. The seemingly complex relationship between the implicit rate and other 
economic rates can be understood in a piecemeal fashion. 
When the SS system is run on a pay-as-you-go basis (5 = 0), the SS benefits to 
generation t old agents in period t + 1 are closely tied to the current working generation 
through two factors: One is the population growth rate, and the other is the growth rate of 
the real wage."' In short, the implicit rate of return on pay-as-you-go SS tax payments is 
given by (b, +1 / Vj) = (1 + n)(Wi +, /wj. When the SS system is run on a fully funded 
basis (5 = 1.0), its implicit rate return rate in period t + 1 is equal to the rate of return on 
physical capital in period t + 1, implying that a fully funded SS system is always 
actuarially fair. More generally, the impUcit rate of return on SS tax payments for any 
funding level 5, 0 < 5 < 1.0, is given by 
Under a partially funded SS system, when the SSTF fraction 5 is large, the 
performance of the flmd itself is the critical factor for determining the implicit rate of 
return. As the SSTF fraction 5 gets smaller, the population and wage growth rates become 
the more critical factors. However, although the analytical expression for the implicit 
rate is simple. Figure 3.3 shows how its use can be complicated. Figiure 3.3(b) and (c) 
reveal that a pay-as-you-go SS arrangement (5 = 0) does not necessarily guarantee a 
higher implicit rate of return than other types of SS arrangements. As a matter of fact, 
there are three arrangements that dominate the pay-as-you-go SS arrangement in terms of 
implicit rate of return. The difficulty in using the implicit rate is that it is difficult to 
+ 5(1 + r). (3-4) 
For a detailed comparison of rates of return for an unfunded SS system, see, for example, Aaron (1966). 
For the case of a pure exchange economy, see Samuelson (1958) where the implicit (internal) rate of return 
on (SS) tax payments is equated to the growth rate of the population. 
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predict the relative effects of a switch in SS arrangements on wage growth and the rate of 
return of physical capital. 
Figure 3.4 shows the time profiles of actuarial status Gj and relative welfare 
benefit RWBt for different SS funding policies 5. As for Case I, Figwe 3.4(a) indicates 
that the economic rates respond to a given SS arrangement in such a way that the 
actuarial status for a given SS arrangement is time-invariant. There is only one SS 
arrangement with a value of 0 that exceeds 1 and hence is actuarially favorable. All other 
arrangements are either actuarially unfavorable (5 < 1.0) or fair (5 = 1.0). The ordering is 
as follows: 
0(5 = .8) > 0(5 = 1.0) > 0(5 = .6) > 0(5 = .4) 
> 0(5 = .2) > 0(5 = 0). 
When evaluating intergenerational equity consequences of alternative SS funding policies 
5 fi-om an SS actuarial status perspective, it is clear that the partially funded SS 
arrangement with 5 = .8 dominates the other SS funding policies over time, with the pay-
as-you-go SS arrangement (5 = 0) yielding the worst outcome. However, Table 3.3 
reveals that this does not hold if intergenerational equity is instead evaluated from 
lifetime utility perspective. 
Recalling the definition (3.1) for welfare benefit WB, the 
state is obtained when the SS fimding policy 5 is set at .6 instead 
ordering is given by 
highest WB in steady 
of .8. The entire 
WB(6 = .6) > WB(5 = .8) > WB(5 = .4) > WB(5 = 1.0) 
> WB(5 = .2) > WB(5 = 0). 
On the other hand, recalling definition (3.3) for relative welfare benefit RWB, Figure 
3.4(b) shows that the ordering of RWB in period 1 is 
RWB,(5 = 0) > RWB,(6 = .2) > RWB,(5 = .4) > RWB,(5 = .6) 
> RWB,(5 = .8) > RWB,(5 = 1.0). 
Noting that the ordering of RWB in any given period is the same as the ordering of WB, 
the ordering of RWB in period 1 indicates that the highest WB in period 1 occurs when 5 
= 0, although the lowest steady state value of WB would be realized by this policy.*" 
It should be noted that the orderings of WB and RWB across periods do not necessarily coincide with 
each other. This is simply because counterfactual lifetime welfare in the RWB measure is different over 
time. For this reason, a comparison of WB across periods may not necessarily be appropriate, although WB 
is often used in comparing intergenerational welfare consequences. For instance, when WB, is greater than 
WB,. 1, does it imply that generation t agents experience a higher degree of intergenerational equity than 
generation t - 1 agents do? Not necessarily, at least, according to the postulated measure, RWB. Suppose 
that there are three generations 1, 2, and 3 whose lifetime utilities, in the absence of SS system, are given 
by 1, 10, and 100, respectively. Upon the implementation of a SS system, suppose their lifetime utilities 
increase by .5, 5, and 50, respectively. The orderings of WB and RWB are then given, respectively, by, 
WB(gen. 3) = 50 > WB(gen. 2) = 5 > WB(gen. 1) = .5, 
More generally, Figure 3.4(b) indicates that there is, in any given period at least 
one SS funding policy that yields higher RWB (hence WB) than 5 = .8. Notice also, from 
Figtire 3.4(a), that all of the SS funding policies except 6 = .8 and 5 = 1 are actuarially 
unfavorable (5 < 1.0). These findings illustrate how the intergenerational equity 
consequences of a SS funding policy, when evaluated on an SS actuarial basis, can be 
misleading. A comparison of the orderings with respect to 0 and WB clearly shows that 
SS actuarial status 0 cannot be considered to be an effective measure of intergenerational 
equity: The measure 0 is not sufficient to reflect the gain or loss in lifetime utility. 
Now, let us take a closer look at the intergenerational equity consequences of 
alternative SS funding policies from a lifetime utility perspective. In the simulations for 
pay-as-you-go SS tax policy T in Section 3.4, it was shown that there is a marked 
possibility of conflict across generations. This is again borne out in the simulations for 
the SS funding policy 5. As indicated in Table 3.3, the ordering of steady state RWB is as 
follows: 
RWB(5 = .6) > RWB(6 = .8) > RWB(6 = .4) > RWB(6 = 1.0) 
> RWB(5 = .2) > RWB(8 = 0). 
and 
RWBCgen. 1) = RWB(gen. 2) = RWB(gen. 3) = .5. 
In this case, the orderings of WB and RWB are not the same. 
However, from a time path perspective. Figure 3.4(b) shows that there is no SS funding 
policy that dominates all other flmding policies in terms of RWB: Although the SS 
funding policy 6= .6 yields the highest value of RWB in period 3 and after, this policy is 
dominated by the SS flmding policy 6 = .2 in period 2 and by the SS funding policies 5= 
0, 6= .2, and 5= .4 in period 1. In particular, given a SS system vvath 6 < 1.0, there is no 
SS flmding policy that increases the value of RWB for some generations without 
reducing it for at least one other generation. Notice, however, that, given the SS funding 
policy 5 = 1.0, there are three funding policies (5 = .4, 6 = .6, and 5 = .8) that yield a 
higher value of RWB for all generations. 
Is there any way to explain the ordering of steady state RWB over various SS 
fiinding policies? There is one, discussed in the previous section, although it fails to 
explain everything. It is shown there that tuning the per capita capital stock to an 
appropriate level might be key to obtaining a pay-as-you-go SS system that ensures the 
higliest possible value for steady state RWB. More precisely, whether an optimal pay-as-
you-go SS system is obtained in steady state completely depends on whether or not the 
steady state rate of return on per capita physical capital is equated to the population 
growth rate. 
Feature 3 described in Section 2.12 implies that this reasoning is also applicable 
to the SS flmding policy 5. Indeed, a comparison of the steady state rate of return f on 
physical capital to the steady state relative welfare benefit RWB verifies this (See Table 
3.3.) That is, when f is close to n = .012, a higher value of steady state RWB is realized. 
It should be noted that this is not applicable for non-steady state values. For instance, as 
seen in Figures 3.3(b) and 3.4(b), the rate of return on physical capital in period 2 that is 
closest to n = .012 occurs with a SS flmding policy 5 = .4, but 5 = .2 yields a higher value 
of RWB for generation 1 agents. 
The main conclusions of this section can be summarized as follows: First, SS 
actuarial status 0 cannot be considered to be an effective measure of intergenerational 
equity. A comparison of Figtire 3.4(a) with Figure 3.4(b) clearly shows that SS actuarial 
status does not accurately reflect the gains or losses in lifetime utilities. In some cases, an 
unfavorable SS actuarial status (0 < l.O) and improved welfare (WB > 0) co-exist, 
implying that an evaluation of a SS system strictly on the basis of SS actuarial status can 
be misleading. This result will be shown in a far more decisive fashion in subsequent 
simulations. Second, no one SS funding policy dominates all other funding policies in 
terms of relative welfare benefit RWB. This shows how difficult it is to resolve potential 
conflicts among generations. 
Most importantly, the conclusions obtained here are not very different from the 
ones drawn for the pay-as-you-go SS tax policy T. This is because, as far as per-capita 
physical capital stock and intergenerational equity as measured via RWB are concerned, 
only the effective SS tax rate T = T(1 - 5) matters. There are, of course, some different 
aspects, most of which are easily seen. First, the implicit rate of return on SS tax 
payments varies considerably over different types of SS arrangements r(T, 5), which may 
constitute one of the reason why the type of SS arrangement Ht, 5) is often considered to 
be a vital matter. Second, as far as the generation 0 old in period 1 are concerned, the SS 
funding policy 6 critically matters even when the effective SS tax rate remain unchanged: 
The generation 0 old always prefer a higher SS tax policy x to a lower one and a lower SS 
funding policy 6 to a higher one. 
However, the generation 0 old agents' preferences over types of SS arrangements 
r(T, 5) does not affect the equilibrium allocation because there is no economic decision 
made by the generation 0 old: they simply collect their capital incomes and SS benefits, if 
any, in period 1. The preferences of generation 0 would potentially effect the equilibrium 
allocation if the SS system were implemented through a voting process, for a SS funding 
policy 5 = 0 would be their unanimous choice in period 1 Notice also that, in period 1, 
an increase in the SS funding policy 5 strictly decreases the value of RWB for generation 
I agents. 
3.6. Social Security Funding Policy and Intergenerationai Equity 
Case 11: = 1.0 
Here, we are concerned with another way in which the SSTF could be used" 
namely, as redistributive transfers. In this case, the SSTF does not provide SS benefits 
because it is not capitalized at all. Instead, the SSTF in each period t is distributed equally 
^ There arise several interesting issues regarding what would happen if a voting process were introduced. 
For instance, even in this deterministic economic model, the consequences are not immediately obvious 
from looking at a time profile of RWB since this only gives the change over time in the lifetime utility of 
young agents. With a voting process it needs to be determined how the current old agents /eel about 
different SS systems, given that they now have only one period of life left. 
among all agents alive in period t. Thus, agents do not view the SSTF as an alternative 
equivalent means for achieving their desired saving. The type of simulations conducted 
for Case I are repeated for Case H. Figures 3.5 and 3.6 summarize the simulation results 
obtained for dynamic equilibrium paths, and Table 3.4 displays steady state equilibrium 
values of some important variables, including the welfare measures 0 and RWB. 
Figiu-e 3.5(a) shows again that an increase in the SSTF fraction 6 raises the per 
capita physical capital stock in each period t and, accordingly, decreases its rate of return. 
The reasoning for this crowding-in effect here in Case 11 is not conceptually different 
from the reasoning for the same effect given for Case I; compare Figure 3.3(a). The 
increase in the SS funding policy 5 decreases the ratio of SS benefits to tax payments in a 
strictly monotone fashion. Although government does not save and invest the SSTF as in 
Case I, there is still another compensating mechanism of SS tax payments that takes place 
outside the SS system. As the government distributes part of the SSTF back to the young 
and the remaining part back to the old, all agents experience an increases in their 
disposable income. 
Since a generation t young agent supplies his labor endowment inelastically to the 
production process for wage income in period t, the imposition of a SS tax does not lead 
to a distortion in the labor market. Consequently, agents in this model do not distinguish 
between different sources of income. In other words, the agents do not care whether their 
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Table 3.4: Steady state equilibrium and intergenerational equity for the economic model 
under alternative SS funding policies 5: Case n (a^ = 1.0) 
~T = .2, n = .012, A = 1.0,a = .3, p = .5 
Variable r(.2, .0) r(.2. .2) r(.2, .4) r(.2, .6) r(.2,.8) r(.2, 1.0) no. 0) 
k .1182 .1259 .1340 .1427 .1518 .1615 .2194 
f .3373 .2797 .2248 .1725 .1226 .0749 -.0133 
w .3689 .3759 .3831 .3903 .3976 .4051 .4441 
V .0738 .0752 .0766 .0781 .0795 .0810 0 
SSTF' 0 .0150 .0306 .0468 .0636 .0810 0 
T - .0076 .1564 .0236 .0320 .0408 0 
b .0747 .0609 .0465 .0316 .0161 0 0 
s" .1196 .1274 .1356 .1444 .1536 .1635 .2220 
c-
.1755 .1809 .1862 .1964 .1965 .2014 .2220 
c" 
.2347 .2315 .2281 .2244 .2206 .2165 .1926 
y .5270 .5370 .5472 .5576 .5681 .5787 .6344 
u -1.595 -1.587 -1.579 -1.574 -1.569 -1.566 -1.576 
u* 40.51 41.35 42.05 42.63 44.10 43.25 42.40 
WB -1.892 -1.054 -.3473 .2259 0.6608 .9517 0 
b / V  1.012 .8096 .6072 .4048 .2024 0 -
e .7568 .6327 .4958 .3453 .1803 0 -
RWB -.0446 -.0248 -.0083 .0054 0.0156 .0224 0 
income comes from SS benefits or from government redistributive transfers. The fact that 
agents do not distinguish between sources of income has an important implication: A 
funded SS system with a "government redistributive transfer expenditure only" fiscal 
policy could be equivalent to a pay-as-you-go SS system with a lower SS tax. More 
precisely, they could have exactly the same effect on the level of per capital physical 
capital as long as the following modified effective SS tax rate x remains imchanged: 
This is why a higher SSTF fraction 5 in Case II has a similar effect to a lower SS tax rate 
T on personal saving. 
For this reason, again, the simulation results for the SS funding policy 5 in Case II 
should not be so different from those for the SS tax policy t and thus funding policy 5 in 
Case I, except concerning the SS actuarial status of agents. Figure 3.6(a) shows that 
actuarial status varies over different SS funding policies 5 in a dramatic fashion. This is 
because, as part of SS benefits that would have been realized in Case I are instead 
distributed out in the form of government redistributive transfers, an increase in the SS 
funding policy 5 tends to decrease, pay-as-you-go SS benefits. For instance, when the SS 
funding policy 5 is 1, there is no SS benefit at all and, thus, the value of actuarial status 0 
(3-4) 
is simply 0. Notice, however, that compensation takes place outside the SS system in the 
form of transfer payments when young and old. 
It is rather straightforward to discuss the intergenerational equity consequences of 
the SS funding poHcy 5. As Figtire 3.6(b) shows, a higher 5 yields a higher value of 
RWB. The ordering of steady state RWB is given by 
RWB(5 = 1.0) > RWB(5 = .8) > RWB(5 = .6) > RWB(5 = .4) 
> RWB(5 = .2) > RWB(5 = 0). 
The ordering can be explained in terms of the steady state rate of return on physical 
capital. As the gap between the net population growth rate n = .012 and the return rate f 
becomes smaller, a higher steady state level RWB is achieved. The highest level RWB 
occurs when the net return rate r is the closest to n = .012, which occurs imder the SS 
fimding policy 6 = 1. Then, we can ask what specification of the SS funding policy for 
the given SS tax rate T =.2 would bring r and n = .012 into equality. Although it can also 
be obtained as a matter of calculation from Feature 1 in Section 2.12, Table 3.3 
immediately shows that the economy experiences too high a level f, and hence under-
accumulation of physical capital, for all tested SS funding policies 5. In particular, for the 
given SS tax rate T = .2, the SS funding policy alone cannot achieve the Pareto optimal 
golden rule allocation in steady state. This suggests that, in certain cases, SS tax policy is 
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more effective than SS funding policy in terms of achieving a Pareto optimal SS 
arrangement. 
A potential conflict across generations is again seen in the time profile of RWB in 
Figure 3.6(b). In period 1, its ordering is exactly reversed from what it is in steady state: 
RWB,(5 = 0) > RWB,(5 = .2) > RWB,(5 = .4) > RWB,(5 = .6) 
> RWB,(5 = .8) > RWB,(5 = 1.0) 
As Figure 3.6(b) indicates, there is no SS funding policy that dominates all other funding 
policies in the sense that it yields a higher RWB for all generations. 
As is obvious, the generation 0 old agents in period 1 prefer a lower SS funding 
policy 5 because it implies a higher (modified effective) pay-as-you-go SS tax rate in 
period 1 and hence higher benefits for them. However, their preferences over the type of 
SS system do not affect the equilibrium allocation since the have no decisions to make. If 
the SS system in period 1 were implemented through a voting process, a pay-as-you-go 
SS system (5 = 0) would be the unanimous choice by all agents in period 1, even though 
this would lead to the lowest level of steady state RWB. 
It should be noted that, even when the SSTF is not validated into equity claims, there is no financial 
strain experienced in the present economic model, (i.e., no particular potential drag effect of the 
government fiscal policy in Case H). This is fimdamentally because, although SS benefits are determined 
partly by how a SS system is arranged and partly by how the SSTF is used by the government fiscal policy, 
an agent's rationality necessitates to dismantle a possible illusion over the government behavior on the 
SSTF. Here suppose that the SS benefits structure is internally inconsistent in such a way that each 
generation t old agent's SS benefits in period t + 1 are also replaced by a fixed fraction of his wage income 
in period t. Then it is highly probable that the SS system may experience a kind of financial squeeze. For 
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3.7. Social Security Funding Policy and Intergenerational Equity 
Case ni: ag = a,j = 0 
We have been considering government fiscal policies involving either physical 
capital investment or redistributive transfer of the SSTF, and their respective 
intergenerational equity consequences from a lifetime utility perspective. Here we deal 
with another type of government fiscal policy: The SSTF in period t is assumed to be 
expended as human capital investment that augments the production of the raw labor of 
generation t young agents. The simulations conducted in Case I and Case II are 
repeated with two different specifications for the efficiency parameter k appearing in 
relation (2.33): A. = 1.0 (low labor productivity) and X. = 3.0 (high labor productivity). 
Figure 3.7 and 3.8 illustrate the simulation results for dynamic equilibrium paths, and 
Table 3.5 displays steady state results. 
First consider the case A, = 1.0. Table 3.5 shows that, although government saving 
is not invested as physical capital, a higher SS funding policy 6 still leads to an increased 
steady state level for per capital physical capital k, implying that a higher 5 tends to 
instance, imagine what would happen when 6 = 1.0 in Case 11: Simply there is no resource to cover the SS 
benefits of the generation t old in period t + 1 at all. Moreover, the passage of resolving the potential 
financial insolvency problem dramatically affect intergenerational equity, implying that, when these 
elements are ingrained together in the SS benefits structure, a discussion over intergenerational equity 
consequences of a SS system tends to be inherently complicated. 
Notice that, throughout history, some portion of old age security has been met by an institution called 
"family" in the form of parents' human capital investment in their children when young and children's care 
for them when old. This has been particularly true in periods when old age security has not been socially 
instimtionalized: The first SS system was implemented in Germany a mere 100 years ago. That is, although 
not included in standard structure of SS systems, human capital investment is one of the traditional ways to 
secure old age security. See Becker (1987, 1991) for this practice, and see Meyer (1987) for the origin of 
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Table 3.5: Steady state equilibrium and intergenerational equity for the economic model 
under alternative SS funding policies 5: Case ELI (ag = a^ = 0) 
—T = .2; n = .012, A = 1.0, a = .3, p = .5,g {1.0,3.0} 
Variable r(.2, .0) r(.2, .2) r{.2, .4) r(.2, .6) r(.2, .8) r(.2, 1.0) 
ic .1182 .1249 .1323 .1404 .1495 .1595 
r .2867 .2797 .2361 .1855 .1349 .08429 
w .3689 .3751 .3816 .3885 .3958 .4036 
e ^=1.0 1 1.015 1.031 1.048 1.065 1.084 
;>i=3.o 1 1.046 1.096 1.150 1.209 1.274 
w ^=1.0 .3689 .3807 .3934 .4070 .4217 .4375 
?L=3.0 
.3689 .3903 .4181 .4468 .4786 .5142 
V A. =1.0 .0738 .0761 .0787 .0814 .0843 .0875 
1=3.0 
.0738 .0785 .0836 .0894 .0957 .1028 
SSTF" k=l.O 0 .0152 .0315 .0488 .0675 .0875 
k=3.0 0 .0157 .0335 .0536 .0766 .1028 
b ?L=l.O .0747 .0617 .0478 .0330 .0171 0 
)i=3.0 .0747 .0635 .0508 .0362 .0194 0 
s" 
1=1.0 
.1196 .1283 .1380 .1489 .1611 .1750 
A. =3.0 
.1196 .1322 .1467 .1364 .1829 .2057 
c" 
X=1.0 




.1755 .1816 .1878 .1940 .2000 .2057 
c° A =1.0 .2347 2268 .2184 .2095 .1999 .1898 
?.=3.0 
.2347 .2357 .2321 .2299 .2269 .2230 





 -1.595 -1.610 -1.627 -1.648 -1.673 -1.702 
X=3.0 
-1.595 -1.580 -1.566 -1.555 -1.546 -1.541 
u» A. =1.0 40.51 39.01 37.25 35.17 32.70 29.75 
;i=3.o 40.51 42.02 43.36 44.50 45.37 45.90 
WB >1=1.0 -1.892 -3.385 -5.145 -7.227 -9.697 -12.65 q
 1
1 
-1.892 -.3845 .9597 2.097 2.968 3.497 
b / V  1.012 .8096 .6072 .4048 .2024 0 






-.0446 -.0800 -.1215 -.1705 -.2288 -.2981 
A. =3.0 
-.0446 -.0090 .0226 .0495 .0701 .0826 
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require agents to self-finance their old age consumptions to a greater extent. Notice that 
their young age income increases due to the enhanced labor skill but there is no direct 
compensating mechanism for the SS taxes paid when young either inside (Case I) or 
outside (Case II) the SS system."^ 
Immediately apparent from Figure 3.7(a) is that the wage rate decreases over time 
in a strictly monotone fashion in the presence of the increase in labor efficiency. Figure 
3.7(c) also illustrates the time profiles of SS actuarial status 0, in which the value of 0. 
being constant over time, decreases with higher 5 for the same reason as discussed in 
Section 3.6. 
From Figure 3.8(a) it is obvious that a higher SS funding policy 5 uniformly 
reduces relative welfare benefit RWBt for all generations t when X= I. The ordering of 
steady state RWB is given by 
0 > RWB(5 = 0) > RWB(6 = .2) > RWB(5 = .4) > RWB(6 = .6) 
> RWB(5 = .8) > RWB(5 = 1.0). 
It is tempting to think that this result from a lower effective tax rate, modified or not. However, this 
reasoning is not applicable to the current case because the increase in 5 implies an increase in human 
capital investment, which increases efficiency e, and hence the effective labor force L, = e,N„ and which in 
turn has a depressing effect on the steady state per-capita physical capital. Instead, a detailed explanation 
can be found from a comparison of the incremental saving and efficiency with respect to the change in 5. 
For instance, the sign of dk/d5depends on (eds''/d5 - s'' de/d5). Noting that paths associated with 
different SS funding policies 5 do not intersect, the ordering attained in the ultimate steady state is the same 
as the ordering in each period t. Hence, higher values of 5 are associated with higher levels of per-capita 
physical capital in non-steady state as well. 
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Thus, for the given SS tax policy x = .2, the highest value of steady state RWB occurs 
when the SS funding policy is 6 = 0, and this value is negative. Note that the ordering is 
reversed from that of Case 11. This result shows that, for generation t agents, the 
beneficial effects of increased wage rates in period t and t + 1 due to an increase in 5, and 
hence an increase in human capital investment, is offset by the negative effects of the 
decrease in SS benefits proportional to the SSTF and of the decrease in capital income. 
These negative effects are most dramatic for generation 1 agents. For example, given an 
increase in 5 to 1, there are no beneficial effects for generation 1 agents, only negative 
effects coming from a decrease in capital income and no SS benefits. If the choice of a SS 
system were decided in period 1 through a voting process, a pay-as-you-go SS system (5 
= 0) would again be the unanimous choice of all period 1 agents. 
Now consider the case when the efficiency parameter is given by A. = 3.0, 
implying that human capital investment is more productive. As Table 3.5 indicates, the 
steady state level k of per capita physical capital is the same for different specifications 
of the efficiency parameter k. The reason for this can easily be easily inferred from the 
basic causal difference equation (2-48) for economic model at hand. [Note, however, that 
this is not applicable to the non-steady state.] Given that k is invariant to changes in k, 
the same must be true for the return rate r and the effective wage rate w. However, the 
actual wage rate w faced by agents is sensitive the changes in k because more productive 
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human capital investment leads to a higher steady state efficiency level e and, 
consequently, a higher steady state wage rate. 
Time paths for the wage rate w, given k = 3.0 under alternative SS funding 
policies 6 = 3.0 are depicted in Figure 3.7(b). These time paths are not always monotone, 
in contrast to the findings for X = 1.0. That is, even in the presence of monotone decrease 
in per-capita physical capital, the time path for the wage rate is not necessarily monotone. 
This is because higher value for the efficiency parameter leads to increased wage rate 
over time in such a way that efficiency increase dominate the effective wage rate decrease 
for some SS funding policies especially in the initial periods. 
Moreover, as indicated in Table 3.5, the steady state implicit rate is the same for a 
= 1.0 and >. = 3.0. This is because, in steady state, the implicit rate of return is not a 
function of X,. The same is true for SS actuarial status. These invariance findings show 
how the equilibrium wage rate and rate of retiun on physical capital respond to changes 
in the SS system in a complicated way. 
Table 3.5 also shows that the steady state RWB levels for X = 3.0 are quite 
different from the corresponding levels for A. = 1.0. First, the ordering is completely 
reversed. For example, the highest steady state RWB level occurs for X = 3.0 when the SS 
system is fully funded (8 = 1.0). The complete ordering for A. = 3 is as follows; 
RWB(5 = 0) > RWB(6 = .2) > RWB(5 = .4) > RWB(5 = .6) 
> RWB(5 = .8) > RWB(5 = 1.0). 
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This reversed ordering shows that, in steady state, when human capital investment is 
more productive, i.e., when A. = 3.0, the beneficial effects of an increased steady state 
wage rate offset the negative effects of a decrease in SS benefits (proportional to the 
SSTF fraction) and capital income (due to a lower return rate). 
This reasoning, however, is not applicable to period 1 and period 2. For instance, 
as seen in Figure 3.8(b), in period 1 the RWB orderings for = 1.0 and A. = 3.0 are the 
same. This can be accounted for by the fact that generation 1 young agents do not enjoy 
any beneficial wage rate effects. Note that government himian capital investment begins 
to take place in period 2 and after. The relatively higher value of RWB for generation 1 
agents under a = 3.0 stems from the higher capital income received in period 2 due to the 
relatively more abundant effective labor force and the resulting increase in the rate of 
return on physical capital in period 2. 
As discussed in Footnote 23, Section 3.7, a maintained SS benefits structure is 
highly likely to lead to financial strain when the SSTF is not in the form of an equity 
claim on real assets that can provide future SS benefits. Moreover, it is often believed 
that, when the financial squeeze is resolved in the form of an increased SS tax rate in 
future periods, there is be a shift of (financial) burden to future generations. However, the 
simulation findings when the productivity of human capital investment is high (X = 3.0) 
suggest that these beliefs may not always be warranted. Instead, the ordering of RWB 
when k = 3.0 provide an example where human capital investment is productive enough 
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to enhance wage rates and lifetime utilities of future generations, implying that an 
increased SS tax rate in futiu-e periods would not impose an onerous burden on the future 
generations. However, the simulation findings when the productivity of human capital 
investment is low (>. = 1.0) caution that it would be a mistake to assume that future 
generations do not bear a financial burden simply because the SSTF is used for their sake. 
Overall, the time paths for RWB are dramatically different for varying values of 
the efficiency parameter X, implying that the productivity of human capital investment is 
critically important for determining the intergenerational equity effects of alternative SS 
systems. In particular, this finding suggests that the intergenerational equity 
consequences of government fiscal policy regarding the SSTF depend not only on who 
will receive the benefits of the policy but also on the extent of the benefits. That is, as 
shown in a consistent way for all simulations conducted so far, the performance of the 
SSTF critically matters, in addition to what government does with the SSTF. 
3.8. Sensitivity Tests 
Simulations are nm for a given government fiscal policy-mix use of the SSTF 
(Case rV: ag = .5 and a^ = 1.0). We first run simulations for baseline values for the 
parameters, as set out in Chapter 2 and maintained throughout Chapter 3. Then, these 
simulations are rerun assuming different values for the net population growth rate, n, the 
share of labor in the production flmction, (1 - a), and the consumption time preference in 
the utility function, P, respectively. By doing so, we can investigate how the relationship 
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between the SSTF and intergenerational equity depends on structural aspects such as a 
decreased population growth rate [from n = .012 to n = -.012], a lower share of labor 
[from (1 - a) = .7 to (1 - a) = .65], and a higher time preference for young age 
consumption [from (3 = .5 to P = .55]. 
Table 3.6 and Figure 3.9 show the sensitivity of the two steady state 
intergenerational equity measures, actuarial status 0 and relative welfare benefit RWB. 
to a decrease in the net population growth rate n. For both the baseline case (n = .012) and 
the case with n = -.012, these measures exhibit the same ordering over different SS 
funding policies 5. These orderings are as follows: 
1 > 0(5 = 0) > 0(5 = .2) > 0(5 = .4) > 0(5 = .6) 
(3-5) 
> 0(5 = .8) > 0(5 = 1.0); 
RWB(5 = .8) > RWB(5 = 1) > RWB(5 = .6) > RWB(5 = .4) 
(3-6) 
> RWB(5 = .2) > RWB(5 = 0). 
A higher SS frmding policy 5 monotonically decreases the steady state SS 
actuarial status 0 and thus the SS actuarial stams in every period t since it is time 
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Table 3.6; Sensitivity tests with respect to n, a, and (3 for Case IV (ag = .5, at =1.0) 
—T = .2; n= {.012, -.012}, a = {.3,.35}P = {.5, .55} 
no. 0) r(.2.0) r(.2, .2) r(.2, .4) r(.2. .6) r(.2. .8) r(.2.1.0) 
k 
Baseline .2194 .1182 .1299 .1426 .1564 .1716 .1882 
n = -.012 .2271 .1224 .1343 .1474 .1617 .1773 .1944 
a = .35 
.1742 .0951 .1044 .1145 .1255 .1273 .1503 
p = .55 
.1888 .0990 .1091 .1202 .1324 .1458 .1607 
r 
Baseline -.1326 .3373 .2522 .1731 .0993 .0303 -.0343 
n = -.012 
-.1531 .3056 .2280 .1460 .0741 .00693 -.0560 
a = .35 
-.0898 .6152 .5201 .4316 .3491 .2720 .1997 
p = .55 
— a 
-.3619 .5140 .4143 .3217 .2353 .1545 -.0789 
s'^ 
Baseline .2220 .1196 .1238 .1287 .1342 .1406 .1481 
n = -.012 
.2243 .1209 .1251 .1299 .1354 .1419 .1493 
a = .35 
.1763 .0962 .0998 .1037 .1081 .1130 .1186 
3 = .55 .1910 .1002 .1032 .1068 .1111 .1162 .1221 
s^ 
Baseline 0 0 .00759 .0156 .0241 .0330 .0424 
n = -.012 0 0 .0077 .0158 .0243 .0333 .0428 
a = .35 0 0 .0059 .0127 .0189 .0260 .0335 
P = . 5 5  
—  n  
0 0 .0072 .0148 .0229 .0314 .0405 
s 
Baseline .2220 .1196 .1314 .1443 .1583 .1737 .1905 
n = -.012 
.2243 .1209 .1327 .1457 .1598 .1725 .1921 
a = .35 
.1763 .0962 .1057 .1159 .1270 .1390 .1521 
P = .55 
.1910 .1002 .1104 .1217 .1340 .1476 .1625 
u* 
Baseline 42.40 40.51 41.71 42.62 43.22 43.49 43.41 
n = -.012 42.23 40.34 41.54 42.44 43.04 43.32 43.24 
a = .4 30.75 21.47 23.62 25.51 27.14 28.51 29.60 
P = .55 43.84 37.95 39.71 41.19 42.37 43.24 43.77 
b/V 
Baseline - -1.0120 .9348 .8418 .7346 .6145 .4829 
n = -.012 
- .9880 .9127 .8220 .7174 .6004 .4720 
a = .35 
- 1.0120 .9816 .8935 .8095 .7112 .5999 
P = .55 
- 1.0120 .9510 .8715 .7564 .6642 .5395 
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Table 3.6: Continued 
r(o,o) r(.2.o) r(.2. .2) r(.2, .4) r(.2. .6) r{.2. .8) r(.2. i.O) 
WB 
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n = -.012 
a = .35 































n = -.012 
a = .35 





































0.4 0.6 0.8 
SS funding policy 
(a) Social security actuarial status 
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 
SS funding policy 









Figure 3.9: Sensitivity of intergenerational equity measures to changes in n, a, and p for 
Case IV (ag = .5, a^ = 1.0) 
—T = .2; n = {.012, -.012}, (1 - a)={.7, .65}, p={.5, .55} 
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invariant. As usual, a greater amount of SS ta.x payments are distributed out in terms of 
transfers with a higher 6. The ordering of RWB shows that the case at hand is 
intermediate between Case I and Case 0. That is, in Case I, the highest RWB occurs 
when 5 = .6, in Case n it occurs when 6 = 1.0, and here it occurs when 6 = 8. More 
importantly, the fact that the same ordering of 0 and RWB is obtained over these two 
distinctively different demographic states suggests that these intergenerational equity 
measures are not sensitive to changes in the (net) population growth rate n. 
Although it is difficult to conduct comparative dynamic analyses in most cases, 
we are fortunate that we can analyze the effects of changes in the population growth rate 
on the optimal steady SS funding policy 5*. From Feature 1 in Section 2.12, we can 
easily find that the sign of (56* / on) is opposite to the sign of (5M / on), where M is 
defined by (2-68). Thus, the partial derivative of M with respect to n will show, for given 
T, ag, and the impact of a change in n on 5*: 
aM 
dn 
e c  +  + P i  -
an 
(n + 2)' ^ 
(3-7) 
Ill 
The sign of (5M / on) depends on the value of the consumption time preference 
p. It is negative when P > .5 and positive when P < .5. So, when P > .5, a decrease in the 
net population growth rate n decreases the optimal SS funding policy 5*, and when P < 
.5, it increases 5*. When P = .5, as is in our baseline specification of the parameter, there 
is no impact of the population growth rate on the optimal SS fimding policy at all, 
explaining why we obtained the same ordering of RWB in the previously discussed 
simulations. Notice that 5* is also invariant to the changes in n when ag = 0 (Case I). 
As indicated in Table 3.6, for a given SS funding policy 5, a lower value of n 
tends to decrease steady state intergenerational equity measured by SS actuarial status. 
Although its impact on RWB is not so uniform, the fact that the ordering (3-6) remains 
unchanged as n decreases indicates that changes in n have a weak impact on RWB. 
Indeed, Miguel-Angel and Lopez-Garcia (1991), in their study of the role of the 
population size in a pay-as-you-go SS system, show that the relationship between the 
population growth rate and lifetime utility is far from clear. 
This result is in sharp contrast with the general notion that different population 
growth rates result in a SS system having significantly different economic and welfare 
consequences. For instance, the popularity of the pay-as-you-go SS system is often 
accounted for by a positive population growth rate. Since the SS benefits of the 
generation t old agents in period t + 1 under a pure pay-as-you-go SS system rely on 
number of generation t + 1 young agents and their work performance, a larger young age 
population would seem to imply greater SS benefits for the generation t old agents 
(positive growth dividend effect). 
Yet, this is not the case with our economic model. Given our assumptions on the 
production technology, a decreased population growth rate increases per capital physical 
capital in the steady state.^' Hence, the steady state wage rate also increases, which in 
tum increases the steady state SS benefits, implying that this wage congestion effect 
weakens at least partially offsets the negative growth dividend effect on SS benefits due 
to the decrease in the population growth rate. In general, then, the complex relationship 
between a SS system and the general equilibrium effects associated with a demographic 
change need to be carefully investigated before it can be said with certainty that a 
particular demographic structure makes one SS system preferable to other SS systems. 
Table 3.6 and Figure 3.9 also show the sensitivity of the steady state 
intergenerational equity measures 0 and RWB to changes in the labor share parameter 
(I - a). The simulation results show that RWB is highly sensitive to changes in (1 - a) 
on two counts. First, for two different values of (1 - a), the baseline value (1 - a) = .7 and 
a lower value (1 - a) = .65, the orderings of RWB over different SS fimding policies 5 
are slightly different. Unlike in the simulation results with the baseline specification (1 -
a) = .7, the highest RWB for (1 - a) = .65 occurs when 5 = 1.0. For both (1 - a) values, 
however, we observe that the value of RWB decreases as 6 increases. Second, and more 
This can be verified from the comparative dynamic study of the change in per capita physical capital 
with respect to changes in n using (2-69) The sign is unambiguously positive. 
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importantly, when the share of labor decreases from (1 - a) = .7 to (1 - a) = .65, agents 
experience a loss in intergenerational equity as measured by RWB for each of the tested 
SS funding policies 5. 
Again, a comparative dynamic analysis of the change in the optimal SS fimding 
policy 5* with respect to a changes in a provides an explanation for this different 
ordering of RWB. More precisely, from condition (2-69) characterizing the steady state 




T.a , . ak  




Mt(l - a) T  >  0 ,  (3-8) 
where M > 0 is given by (2-68). 
Thus, for given x, ag, and a^, a lower labor share (1 - a) raises the optimal steady 
state SS funding policy 5*, which explains the different orderings determined for RWB 
in the simulations. The negative values of RWB in Figure 3.9(b) for (1 - a) = .65 can be 
explained again by condition (2-67) characterizing the steady state golden rule allocation. 
That is, the optimal pay-as-you-go SS rate x*, given (1 - a) = .65, is negative, meaning 
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that agents are better off in the absence of a SS system (T = 0) than in the presence of a 
SS system (t > 0). 
Finally, Table 3.6 and Figure 3.9 also show the sensitivity of 0 and RWB to an 
increase in the consumption time preference P from the baseline value .5 to .55. It is 
already suggested, from the sensitivity of intergenerational measures to changes in the 
population growth rate, that p plays a central role in the determination of the impact of n 
on RWB. These simulation findings exhibit the same qualitative pattern as the 
simulation findings for the sensitivity of 0 and RWB to a decrease in (1 - a), except 
with regard to magnitudes. That is, the orderings of RWB are different for the different P 
values; when the consumption time preference increases from p = .5 to p = .55. agents 
experience a decrease in steady state 0 and RWB for each of the tested SS funding 
policies 5. Again, we conclude that intergenerational equity as measured either by 0 or by 
RWB is sensitive to changes in the consumption time preference parameter, as verified 
also in many other studies of SS systems. For instance, Imrohoroglu, Imrohoroglu, and 
Joines (1992) show that the optimal SS tax rate is zero when P > .5 and positive when 
P<.5. 
Overall, the population growth rate n appears to have only a weak impact on the 
relationship between the SS frmding policy 5 and intergenerational equity, especially as 
measured by RWB. In contrast, the share of labor (1 - a) and the consumption time 
preference P seem to have crucial impacts on this relationship. One implication: A switch 
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to a more fiilly funded SS system is justified in response either to a decreased share of 
labor or an increased consumption time preference for young age consumption, but not 
necessarily in response to a decrease in the population growth rate. 
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CHAPTER 4. SUMMARY 
4.1. The Economic Model 
Understanding how different social security (SS) systems affect the economy and 
intergenerational equity draws considerable attention, especially in the context of 
changing structural aspects in the economy. In this dissertation we pay particular 
attention to the degree to which SS systems are funded and to the alternative government 
fiscal policies regarding the use of the SSTF in order to investigate the resulting 
economic and intergenerational equity consequences. To carry out this investigation, we 
develop a computational two periods lived overlapping generations model in which a 
wide range of possible SS arrangements and possible government fiscal uses of the SSTF 
are incorporated in parameterized form: namely, two SS arrangement parameters and two 
goverrmient fiscal policy parameters. This parameterization of the SS system permits the 
comparative dynamic study of a family of SS systems. 
The evolution of the economic model is fully accounted for by a basic causal 
difference equation (BCDE), equation (2-48) by which the time path of the physical 
capital/effective labor ratio is traced down. Moreover, the economic model is 
characterized in terms of three features. Feature 1 provides a steady state golden rule 
Pareto optimal condition. Feature 2 compares private saving S"" with the SSTF and/or the 
government saving S® concerning potential economic effects. Feature 3 reveals that, 
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under a certain government fiscal policy use of the SSTF, the type of SS arrangement can 
be irrelevant to the economy. 
4.2. Responses of the Economy 
The simulation results for SS tax policies T show that an increase in the tax rate 
under pay-as-you-go SS system (5 = 0) crowds out per capita physical capital in each 
time period. This can also be seen analytically. First, the sign of dk/dt is unambiguously 
negative. Second, the time paths for kt generated by the BCDE (2-48) for different t 
values do not intersect each other. Putting these two findings together suffices to show 
why SS tax rate unambiguously crowds out the physical capital/labor ratio in each 
period t in the sense that kt(x") < kt(T') if r" > z'. 
The simulation results of SS funding policies 5 (Cases I, II, and HI) show that, 
regardless of the type of government fiscal policy use of the SSTF, an increase in the 
SSTF Section 5 increases the physical capital/(efFective) labor ratio in each period. The 
extent of the crowding-in and its underlying causes are quite different, though. The 
responses of the economy to changes in the SS fimding policy 5 under altemative 
government fiscal use of the SSTF are summarized in Table 4.1. 
When the SSTF is used by government purely for physical capital investment 
expenditxire (Case I), the crowding-in of the physical capital/labor ratio due to an increase 
of the SSTF firaction 5 is explained in an intuitively obvious way. In Case I, an increase in 
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Table 4.1: Effects on key variables and intergenerational equity of alternative SS fundin 
policies 5 and alternative government fiscal policy uses of the SSTF 
—T = .2;n = .012, A= 1.0,a = .3, p = .5,>. e {1.0,3.0^ 
r(.2, .0) r(.2, .2) r(.2, .4) r(.2, .6) n bo r(.2. 1.0) 
k 
Case I .1182 .1339 .1516 .1715 .1939 ,2194 
Case n .1182 .1259 .1340 .1427 .1518 .1615 
Case III .1182 .1249 .1323 .1404 .1495 .1595 
s"" 
Case I .1196 .1355 .1534 .1735 .1762 .2220 
Case II .1196 .1274 .1356 .1444 .1536 .1635 
Case III ?L=1.0 .1196 .1283 .1380 .1489 .1611 .1750 
k=3.0 
.1196 .1322 .1467 .1364 .1829 .2057 
s" 
Case I .1196 .1355 .1534 .1735 .1622 .2220 
Case II .1196 .1274 .1356 .1444 .1536 .1635 
Case III X = l . O  .1196 .14353 .16947 .1977 .22857 .2625 
A = 3.0 




Case I 40.51 42.05 43.05 43.49 43.30 42.40 
Case II 40.51 41.35 42.05 42.63 43.25 
Case III /.= I.O 40.51 39.01 37.25 35.17 32.70 29.75 
;^ = 3.o 40.51 42.02 43.36 44.50 45.37 45.90 
WB 
Case I -1.892 -.3549 .6521 1.090 0.9004 0 
Case II -1.892 -1.054 -.3473 .2258 0.6608 .9517 
Case in A.= I.O -1.892 -3.385 -5.145 -7.227 -9.6970 -12.65 
;^ = 3.o 
-1.892 -.3804 .9597 2.097 2.968 3.497 
0 
Case I .7568 .8670 .9404 0.9927 1.014 1.000 
Case n .7568 .6327 .4958 .3453 .1803 0 
Case in I .7568 .6292 .4912 .3415 .1783 0 
RWB 
Case 1 -.04462 -.00837 .01538 .02570 .02124 0 
Case II -.04462 -.02487 -.00819 .00533 .01558 .02245 
Case in X = l . O  -.04462 -.07984 -.1214 -.1704 -.22880 -.2982 
X = 3.0 
-.04462 -.00907 .02263 .04945 .07000 .08248 
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5 is equivalent to a decrease in x as long as the effective tax rate x remains unchanged. 
Hence, the crowding-in associated with the SSTF in Case I is explained by the crowding 
out phenomenon associated with changes in x under a pure pay-as-you-go SS system. For 
the same reason, the exact magnitude of 6 in Case I is irrelevant to the economy, and the 
same time path for per-capita physical capital can be generated by two distinctively 
different SS systems, such as a SS system with low x and low 5 and a SS system with 
high X and high 5. 
The crowding-in process in Case n is not so different from the one in Case I. 
(Recall the modified effective tax rate.) The only two differences lie, first, in the 
compensating mechanism of SS taxes paid, and, second, in the extent of the crowding-in. 
This is because, first, part of compensation of SS taxes paid by generation t young agents 
takes place outside the SS system in terms of redistributive transfers and, second, part of 
the SSTF is transferred to young age agents. One implication: Agents' rationality alone 
prevents a possible illusion regarding the government fiscal use of the SSTF so that there 
is no fiscal drag effect even when the SSTF is not transferred into an equity claim 
Contrary to an original conjecture that higher labor efficiency due to government 
human capital investment on labor would depress the physical capital/effective labor 
ratio, an increase in the SSTF flection 6 still raises the physical capital/labor ratio in Case 
m. This is explained by the fact that the enhanced labor sidlls of agents increases their 
wage incomes and, in the absence of any direct compensating mechanism by government, 
private agents tend to self-finance their old age consumption to a relatively greater extent. 
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4.3. Actuarial Status as a Measure of Intergenerational Equity 
In the simulations of alternative SS tax rates T under a pure pay-as-you-go SS 
system, the values of SS actuarial status 0 are less than one for all tested T values except 
T = .4, implying that 0 has a negative effect on lifetime utility. This result is somewhat 
surprising since, in an increasing population economy, the advantage of a pay-as-you-go 
SS system has been often attributed to the positive effect of 0 on lifetime utility. The 
explanation of our result is obtained through a comparison of the rate of return on 
physical capital to the implicit rate of return on SS taxes paid. SS tax contributions tends 
to be dominated by personal saving in terms of the rate of return. More importantly, 
lifetime utility for some generations increases even with the lack of the dominance. 
This matter is further clarified fi-om the simulation results for a range of SS 
funding policies 5 under alternative government fiscal policies regarding the SSTF. In 
Case I (ag = 0 and = 1.0), the only actuarially favorable SS system (5 = .8) yields the 
second highest steady state value for RWB. In both Case II (ag = 1.0) and III (a^ = a^ = 0), 
regardless of the magnitude of RWB, the value of 0 falls as 6 increases. More 
particularly, in both Case n and HI, for a relatively high productivity of human capital (A. 
= 3.0), the highest value for RWB and the lowest value for 0 are realized when the SS 
system is fully funded (5 = 1.0). This is partly because the SSTF is not validated into 
equity claim that can provide SS benefits in Case n and in. [Notice that, when 5 = 1.0, 
the value of 0 for these cases is 0.] 
Overall, the results obtained during the course of our simulations consistently 
show that SS actuarial status 0 cannot be considered to be an effective measure of 
intergenerational equity, suggesting that an evaluation of a SS system on the basis of SS 
actuarial status 0 can be misleading, especially when the government fiscal use of the 
SSTF is not considered. It should be noted that the economy at hand responds to SS 
system in such a way that 0 for a given SS system time-invariant. 
4.4. SSTF, the Government Fiscal Policy Use of the SSTF, and RWB 
When the SSTF is assumed to be invested entirely as physical capital (Case I: a^ = 
0 and = I.O), the SSTF in period t is capitalized into a claim on capital income in 
period t + 1. As a result, the only effect of a change in the SS fimding policy 6 lies in how 
much the change in 5 changes the effective SS tax rate t . As Figure 4.1 shows, the 
highest value of steady state intergenerational equity as measured by RWB occurs when 
the SS system is partially funded (5 = .6). This is because a SSTF Section 5 = .6 is the 
closest to the Pareto optimal SSTF Section 5*. However, 5 = .6 does not necessarily 
dominate the other funding policies in terms of RWB in each period. As a matter of fact, 
given a SS system with 6 < 1.0, there is no other SS funding policy 5' such that a switch 
fi"om 6 to 6' increases the value of RWB in every period. This lack of dominance shows 
how difficult it is to resolve potential conflicts among generations. 
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Figure 4.1: :Comparison of intergenerational equity under alternative SS funding policies 
5 and alternative government fiscal policy uses of the SSTF 
—T = .2; n = .012, a = .3, P = .5, A. = {1.0, 3.0} 
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not capitalized into an equity claim for future SS benefits. Thus, agents do not view the 
SSTF as an other equivalent way to save although a compensating mechanism of SS 
taxes paid takes place in the form of redistributive transfers. Recall that, due to the 
absence of a distortion in the labor market, agents in this economic model do not 
distinguish between different sources of income. Consequently, as long as a certain 
modified effective SS tax rate t remains unchanged, a higher SS funding policy 5 is 
equivalent to a lower SS tax rate T; see (3-4). 
As Figure 4.1 shows, the highest value of RWB occurs when the SS system is 
fully funded (5 = 1.0). Based on the modified effective SS tax rate t , we apply the same 
explanation given in Case I to Case II as well. That is, the steady state rate of return on 
physical capital closest to the population growth rate occurs when 5 = 1.0. A marked 
possibility of conflict across generations is again borne out in the simulation results of 
Case 11: No SS flmding policy 5 dominates all other SS flmding policies in terms of 
RWB. 
When the SSTF is assumed to be invested entirely as human capital (Case III: ag = 
= 0), die SSTF is again capitalized but in a different form. Hence, unlike Case I, the 
SSTF in period t does not directly serve to provide SS benefits for the generation t old in 
period t + 1. Moreover, unlike Case n, there is no direct compensating mechanism for SS 
tax contributions that takes place outside the SS system. It is only in terms of changes in 
the wage rates and the rates of return on physical capital over time that both beneficial 
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and detrimental effects of alternative possible SS funding policies 5 can be tracked down 
and judged. 
Although the two different values for the efficiency parameter (a. = 1.0 and = 
3.0) yield the same steady state physical capital/effective labor ratio, the resulting 
economic and intergenerational equity consequences are quite different. Clearly, a 
glimpse of Figure 4.1 is enough to verify this point. When the productivity of human 
capital investment is relatively low (A. = 1.0), a higher SS funding policy 5 strictly 
decreases the value of RWB, implying that a less flmded SS system is desirable. When 
the productivity of human capital investment is relatively high (A. = 3.0), a higher SS 
funding policy 5 strictly increases the value of RWB (more precisely, RWB in period 3 
and later): By this, we infer that, for X = 3.0, as 5 increases, the beneficial effects of 
increased wage rates due to enhanced labor skills dominate the negative effects of 
decreased SS benefits (proportional to the SSTF fraction) and a decrease of capital 
income (due to decreased rates of return on physical capital). 
An important finding from the comparison of these simulation results for Case III 
is that what really matters for intergenerational equity as measured by RWB is the extent 
of the benefits (the productivity of the SSTF) and thus human capital technology rather 
than simply who receives the benefits. This point is further strengthened by recalling that 
a choice between government physical capital investment and government redistributive 
transfers is distinguished only by how differently the per-capita physical capital is 
affected. 
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There are, however, many potential scenarios which would lead to different 
intergenerational equity consequences under alternative fiscal policies regarding the 
SSTF. This is shown by a thought experiment in which a SS system is internally 
inconsistent in such a way that some kind of financial strain is highly likely to occur. That 
is, unlike in our economic model, when an agent's SS benefits are assumed to be 
determined as a fixed fraction of wage income (or disposable income), some kind of 
financial squeeze is highly likely to occur. In this case the type of government fiscal 
policy use of the SSTF, together with options taken to resolve the financial deficit, could 
lead to greatly varying intergenerational equity consequences. In general, this thought 
experiment illustrates that, when potentially contradicting elements are ingrained together 
in a SS system, a discussion of intergenerational equity consequences associated with 
different government uses of the SSTF tend to be inherently complicated. 
4.5. Structural Aspects 
It is often considered that demographic changes have important economic and 
intergenerational consequences for a SS system. Yet, our simulation results regarding the 
sensitivity of RWB to a decrease in the net population growth rate show that the 
relationship between the population growth rate, n, and the SS flmding policy 5 is weak. 
In short, the orderings of RWB under alternative policies 5 associated with two 
distinctively different population growth rates are shown to be the same, as verified by a 
comparative dynamic analysis. This finding suggests, for instance, that a particular 
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demographic strucmre alone may not make one particular type of SS system preferable to 
other SS types of systems. 
Our simulation results regarding the sensitivity of RWB to a decrease in the labor 
share parameter (1 - a) in the production function and to an increase in the consumption 
time preference parameter P in the utility flmction show that RWB is highly sensitive to 
changes in these parameters. Given either a decreased labor share or an increased 
consumption time preference, agents begin to experience a decrease in steady state 
intergenerational equity as measured by RWB. Moreover, given either a decreased labor 
share or increased consumption time preference, a more funded SS system exhibits less of 
a decrease in RWB. Overall, our simulation results and sensitivity tests suggest that 
more funding for a SS system is justified given either a decreased labor share or an 
increased consumption time preference but not necessarily given a decreased population 
growth rate. 
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CHAPTER 5. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
As clarified by this study, intergenerational equity depends partly on the type of 
social security (SS) arrangement and partly on the government fiscal use of the social 
security trust fimd (SSTF). We have been concemed with both aspects, and we have been 
led to the surprising finding that the particular type of SS arrangement and the 
government fiscal use of the SSTF may not be particularly important for intergenerational 
equity when some conditions are satisfied. The chief reasoning for this finding is that, 
due to the absence of distortion in the labor market, agents tend to be indifferent to the 
type of saving and the source of income. For instance, when the SSTF is invested in the 
form of physical capital, agents are indifferent with respect to private versus public 
saving, and to source of income as long as they attain the same rate of retiuia. 
Also, we show in quite a simple way that, although SS acmarial status is one 
standard measure used in the analysis of SS systems, it is not an effective measure of 
intergenerational equity. The reason for this is that, although SS actuarial status may 
affect lifetime utility, it is not the sole factor that does so. Moreover, contrary to the 
general notion that one of the major underlying reasons requiring the transformation of 
SS systems is demographic change, we show that having a particular population structure 
does not necessarily make one type of SS system preferable to other types of SS systems, 
especially when viewed fi:om the perspective of relative welfare benefit. 
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We should admit that a careful reading of this dissertation would lead a reader to 
realize many drawbacks of the current study that should be addressed in future studies. 
First, quite immediately, a labor economist would find that the current study does not 
allow for an endogenous labor supply. Many results obtained during the course of our 
simulations could presumably be modified if, instead, agents were permitted to choose 
labor supplies, implying that the SS tax rate then has distortionary effects. 
Second, the govenunent fiscal use of the SSTF is very primitively specified in the 
current study. For example, instead of government public consumption expenditure, a 
simple redistributive transfer expenditure is used to describe the transfer of the SSTF to 
current living generations. Notice that government transfer expenditures are not included 
in the traditional gross national product (GNP) at all, hence the current specification may 
not be the most appropriate way to investigate government fiscal behavior. 
Third, the specification of human capital investment is primitive as well. Unlike 
Lucas (1988) and Romer (1986), the public good aspects of human capital investment, 
such as increasing returns to scale and spillover effects are not considered. Once a more 
appropriate human capital production relation is incorporated, the study can be further 
extended to investigate competing aspects between private and public human capital 
investments as shown in Orazem and Tesfatsion (1997). 
Finally, another great drawbacks in this dissertation is that the economic model 
postulates a representative agent and thus intragenerational equity is completely ignored. 
However, we do not know yet how to incorporate heterogeneous agents into our 
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economic model while maintaining the ability to derive explicitly the basic dynamic 
equations governing the economy. Putting aside this technical difficulty, we expect that 
the incorporation of intragenerational equity into our economic analysis would be 
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